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Supervisor: Dr. Anelise Reich Corseuil
The aim o f the present thesis is to analyse the construction o f ambiguity in the 
narrative o f the film A Clockwork Orange, by Stanley Kubrick (1971). In a selection o f  
scenes, I investigate the mechanisms that operate in the relation o f identification-detachment 
that the film promotes between the protagonist and the viewer, and the peculiar way in which 
the film depicts violence, which are the two main feces ambiguity acquires in the film. In 
order to discuss Kubrick’s identity as an auteur, I draw upon writings firom the Cahier du 
Cinéma to Rolland Barthes (1987). And in the analysis o f A Clockwork Orange, narrative 
theories by Genette (1990), Chatman (1993) and KozlofiF (1988) are en^loyed. The thesis 
also dialogues with the criticism on Kubrick’s films developed by Koflcer (1980), and 
Menezes (2001), among others. Stanley Kubrick’s filmography is marked by controversies. 
As an auteur, Kubrick seems to be characterised by the escape fi-om a precise definition. His 
films present a movement toward ambiguity which begins with more tra^tional structures and 
characters, gradually abandoning secure moral positions. Three fitos wiU be discussed as a 
sample o f the director’s filmography in order to trace the evolution o f his world view and 
style; Dr. Strangelove or How I  Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1963), 2001 
- A Space Odyssey (1968) dXià. Eyes Wide Shut (1999).The director’s pessimistic view o f  
humankind in fece o f civilisation is reflected in a narrative form that fevours ambiguity 2Bid 
avoids value judgement. It is also possible to notice, in the director’s work, a refiisal o f the 
identification strategies characteristic o f the apparatus o f mainstream cinema. The pathway to 
ambiguity that could be perceived in Kubrick’s trajectory finds its most problematic moment 
in A Clockwork Orange, which came to be his most polemic film.
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A presente dissertação tem como objetivo analisar a construção da ambigüidade na 
narrativa do filme Laranja Mecânica, de Stanley Kubrick (1971). Eu investigo, nas cenas 
selecionadas, os mecanismos que operam na relação identificação-a&stamento que o filn^ 
promove entre o protagonista e o espectador, assim como o modo peculiar como o filme 
trata a violência, por serem essas as duas principais feces que a ambigüidade adquire no filme. 
A  fim de discutir a identidade de Kubrick como auteur, eu recorro aos textos desde os 
Cahiers du Cinéma a RoUand Barthes (1987). Na análise de Laranja Mecânica, são 
ençregadas teorias da narrativa de Genette (1990), Chatman (1993) e Kozloff (1988). A  
dis^rtação dialoga ainda com a crítica aos filmes de Kubrick empreendida por Kolker (1980) 
e Menezes (2001) entre outros. A filmografia de Kubrick é marcada por controvérsias. Como 
imi auteur, Kubrick parece caracterizar-se pela fiiga de uma definição precisa. Seus filmes 
apresentam um movimento em direção à ambigüidade que se inicia com estruturas e 
personagens mais tradicionais, abandonando gradualmente as posições morais seguras. Três 
filn ^  são discutidos como uma amostra da obra do diretor, de modo a traçar a evolução de 
seu estilo e sua visão de mundo; Dr. Fantástico ou Como Aprendi a Parar de me Preocupar 
e Amar a Bomba (1963), 2001- Uma Odisséia no Espaço (1968) e De Olhos Bem Fechados 
(1999). A visão pessimista do diretor em fece da civilização refiete-se na forma narrativa que 
fevorece a ambigüidade e evita julgamentos de valor. Percebe-se ainda, na obra do diretor, 
unaa recusa das estratégias clássicas de identificação. A trajetória em direção à ambigüidade 
nos filmes de Kubrick tem seu momento mais problemático em Laranja Mecânica, que veio a 
ser seu mais polêmico filme.
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Introduction
This is where the real weepy and like tra^c part of 
the story begins, d i my b-others and only Mends*
A Clockwork Orange
The cinema industry produces, now and then, pieces that have the power to become 
unforgettable, to move numerous audiences or to insult them, to keep the media busy for good 
or for bad and to become symbols o f an age. When^ Clockwork Orange was first released, m 
1971, the world o f arts gained one o f such remarkable moments. And a problem. The film, 
adapted from Anthony Burgess’s homonymous novel, and produced and directed by Stanley 
Kubrick, generated a controversy m which attack and defence were equally passionate, and 
integrated a debate that has survived persistently these thirty years without a pacific 
conclusion.
The paradoxical reactions to the work seem to reflect a strong ambiguity within the 
film itself. The disturbing eJffect o f A Clockwork Orange may not be only related to the acts o f 
violence that it pictures but to Kubrick’s style and narrative choices as well. As Pauline Kael 
notes (in the article in which she strongly attacks the work and the director), “the film has a 
distinctive style o f estrangement ( ...)  the movie doesn’t look like others, or soimd like them,”  ^
One o f the indicators (or consequences) o f this estrangement is that the film hardly fits a 
genre classificatioa In the absence o f a suitable category, some critics, as Scott ThiU in his 
Encyclopedia o f  Popular Culture^, have labelled A Clockwork Orange as a science fiction 
piece. But the classification shows to be questionable, for the film could also be said to be a 
psychological drama, or a black comedy, or many other imaginable hybrid categories. While 
it contains elements o f all those genres, the film does not seem to fiilly belong to any o f them.
‘ All dialogue quotatiwis, in the epigraphs or within the text, are direct transcriptions from the films. 
 ^Pauline Kael. “Stanley Strangelove”. The New Yorker, January, 1972. In: The Kubrick Site.
 ^A Clockwork Orange (entry), http://www.geocities.asn/area51/shire/3566/clockwork.html
The fundamental concern o f the analysis is the ambiguity that characterises A 
Clockwork Orange and which seems to be responsible for the disturbing effect o f the film. 
The present thesis is motivated by the controversy that surrounds the film, or to put it better, 
by the wish to understand how can a work o f art move its audience in such a contr^ictory 
way, what are the elements operating in the construction o f that disturbing narrative, by what 
means can it achieve that level o f ambiguity and what are its moral implications. In order to 
answer these questions, I will investigate the dubious relation that the film suggests between 
the protagonist and the viewer and the peculiar way in which the film depicts violence, 
including the violence that is practised by the film itself against the viewer, and not only by 
character against character.
Ambiguity is a trace that seems to be present in every element o f the picture, fi*om its 
construction o f characters and the mechanisms o f narration (the camera movements, the use 
o f voice-over, the naanagement o f the information presented to the viewer), passing through 
the mise-en-scene (with its peculiar use o f colours and the arrangement o f the sets), finally 
overcoming the boundaries o f the film to invade the space o f the viewer. The film plays with 
the spectator’s identification and detachment firom the prot^onist. Both in the novel and in 
the film, the narrative is submitted to the verbal narrator Alex (performed in the film by 
Malcolm McDowell) who presents the events according to his own view o f them. The 
amorality o f his character, the perverse vision o f violence as a funny game, the placid and 
distanced reaction before the victims’ suffering contrasting with his self-pity, the traces o f his 
problematic personality and world view find echo in the narrative. In the film, the mise-en- 
s c ^ ,  editing and camera movement reinforce the ambiguous effect, alternating elements o f  
estrangement-which enlarge the distance between Alex and the spectator-with strategies o f  
identification that approximate the viewer to Alex’s e^qierience. And while it presents a 
character that haunts the peace and order o f society, the film mitigates the moral distance
between spectator and protagonist, and suggests that the audience empathise with him. The 
/^ambiguity o f A Clockwork Orange reverberates through the universe o f the spectator, it is 
present in the different interpretations that the film offers, it jeopardises the security o f the 
viewer who has akeady constructed an aesthetic and narrative pattern that provides her with a 
pacific understanding o f the stories, the viewer who has learned to read in the school o f  
Hollywood cinema.
Such a disturbing style, rather uncommon in a film o f the great industry, would not 
pass unnoticed. A Clockwork Orange was recognised as a masterpiece. The film was named 
the Best Film o f the year and Kubrick Best Director by The New York Film Critics, and 
earned Oscar nominations for best pictxu-e, director, adapted screenplay and film editing. It 
became a model o f technical excellence and an icon o f pop culture. Yet, in spite o f such 
fervent acclamation it also feced a violent opposition. In England, the polemics reached the 
Parliament, and the aggressive reactions to the work culminated in the director’s decision to 
withdraw the film from distribution in the coimtry after sixty-one weeks o f successfiil 
exhibition. But British polemics, although probably the most intense, not an isolated case. 
In the United States, thanks to the scenes o f violence and sex it presented, the film was 
classified as X-rated by the Motion Picture Association o f America, a label that attributed to it 
the status o f ‘adult film’ and restricted considerabfy its audience'*. And even Anthony 
Burgess, the author o f the original novel and a fervent defender o f Kubrick in the press by the 
time o f the film’s release, stated about the cinematic adulation, years later, in his 
autobiography: “a vindication o f fi^e wiU had become an exaltation o f the urge to sin.”  ^The 
original novel had already had its share in the polemics. First published in 1962, the book 
inspired opposition even before printing. Burgess' literary agent resisted presenting the novel 
to a publisher, because, in his words, its "pornography o f violence would be certain to make it
'* The Kubrick Site
 ^Anthony Burgess. "You've Had Your Time." In: The Kubrick Site
unacceptable."® In England, its native land, Burgess’s work did not find great support. What 
the author considered to be a defence o f liberum arbitrium, a philosophical lanqjoon against 
the mistaken methods with which the State treated social problems, was dismissed as a pop 
eulogy to violence, with a potential pernicious influence on the youth. In the USA, on the 
other hand, the novel inspired respect o f the critics and soon was worshipped in the pop 
culture circles^. Burgess had to make concessions, nevertheless. W.W. Norton Inc., which 
bought the book in New York, demanded the exclusion o f the last chapter, in which Alex, the 
violent hero, realises that he is too grown-up to go on attacking people or vandalising the 
streets, and renovmces violence to look for a woman with whom he would have a son. 
Kubrick’s film is based on the American version o f the novel, therefore excluding this final 
maturation process o f Alex’s.
It was only with the screen ad^tation, however, that the novel acquired widespread 
fame, which for Burgess was more a curse than a blessing. The media ascribed to Burgess as 
well as to Kubrick the responsibility o f creating the polemic story, and the writer was called to 
defend the film in the press (replacing the director, who tended to be reticent about his 
position), and got himself involved in an exhaustive debate which was generally restricted to 
the issues o f violence and a supposed pornographic mark o f the film, rather than in any 
philosophical, sociological or psychological question that A Clockwork Orange raised.
According to critic Christian Bugge, the controversy was due not simply to the 
content o f the film itself but also to the feet that its release coincided with a moment when the 
theme o f violence was particularly unwelcome. In Britain, the set o f the most acute polemics, 
urban violence was on the spot. In that year o f 1972, the tensions aroxmd the Northern Ireland 
conflict had achieved one o f its most problematic moments, when the IRA bomb outrage at 
Aldershot killed five civilians. Bugge explains:
* Christian Bugge. “The Clockwork Cmtroversy.” In: The Kubrick Site. 
’ Anthony Burgess. "You've Had Your Time." ti: The Kubrick Site
There existed a certain sense o f inevitability that given the contemporary 
mood the film was not going to be judged on its own merits, but put into a 
much larger context o f societal concerns. Since the 1950s more and more onus 
had been directed towards the accountability o f the power o f  films to influence 
their spectators. Many had thought that the arts were going too far and they 
needed to be checked. A Clockwork Orange was at the end o f a long line o f 
hysteria that was bound to lead to its downfeU*.
In the press, one o f the most critical moments o f the polemics was afforded by 
The New York Times. Between January and February 1972, the newspaper published a 
debate involving the fikn critic Fred Hechinger, the actor Malcolm McDowell, and 
Stanley Kubrick himself. Motivated by the director’s declarations that man was “an 
ignoble savage”  ^ and McDowell’s provocative statement that liberals hated the film 
“because they’re dreamers and it shows them realities” ®^, Hechinger developed his 
argument against A Clockwork Orange. For him “any liberal with brains should hate 
Clockwork, not as a matter o f artistic criticism but for the trend this film represents. An 
alert liberal should recognize the voice o f fescisnt” *^
And indeed, the film seems to call for a reflection that goes beyond violence and sex 
on themselves, or a mere rejection to an imfemiliar style. The film provokes questions about 
the results-or more precisely the failure-of humankind’s attempt to mask the violent nature o f 
itself and o f the civilisation it has built. The idea that the film talks about something broader 
than the saga o f a psychotic teenager provided a connectk>n between A Clockwork Orange 
and the rest o f Stanley Kubrick’s filmography and led to the necessity o f including other films 
in this study. In the director’s work, there seems to be a prevailing pessimism in fece o f
® Craig McGregor. “Nice Boy from the Bronx?’ The New York Times, January 30,1972 In: The Kubrick Site 
Tom Burke. “Malcolm NfcDowell: ‘LibCTals, They Hate Clockwork.’” TTk  New York Times. January 30,1972, 
In: The Kubrick Site
" Fred Hechinger. “A Liberal Fights Back”. The New York Times, February 13,1972. In; The Kubrick Site
Western capitalist civilisation. The institutions it created in order to organise and govern 
itself-be it the army, the State or the faraily-are presented throughout the films as the 
human’s main source o f pain. And people, unable to understand themselves and the world, are 
caught in the trap they themselves have prepared, becoming dehunaanised, or insane, or
Y marginal.
Although A Clockwork Orange remains the centre o f the thesis, the study o f the other 
films offers an overview o f the development o f that vision o f human fete, showing the 
different feces it can acquire in the various contexts and how the films evolve from an already 
dark but still hopeful prospect o f civilisation, to the abandoning o f beliefs, and the final 
^cceptance o f ambiguities and contradictions o f himian nature. The films approached here are 
Dr. Sirangelove or How I  Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1963), 2001—A 
Space Odyssey (1968) and Eyes Wide Shut (1999). Among the director’s filmography these 
works-all o f them also polemic pieces-seem to be the most directly concerned with the 
predicament o f ambiguity.
The first chapter is dedicated to the discussion o f how those ideas are presented in 
the films, trying to show the trajectory towards a loss o f centres that is delineated in the 
director’s work. And since the whole point o f the chapter depetids on the idea that there is a 
certain coherence among the films which is related both with thematic concerns and with the 
development o f an aesthetic project (which integrates those themes in the formal elements o f 
the movie), it was pertinent to provide a brief review on the notion o f authorship. Beginning 
with the French champions o f the politique des auteurs and ending in the post-structuralist 
writings o f Barthes and Foucaxilt, I try to determine the sense in which Kubrick is taken as an 
auteur in this thesis.
Chapter II presents an analysis o f A Clockwork Orange. Starting from the idea that 
this film occupies a special place in Kubrick’s work, thanks to the treatment it gives to a
problematic issue such as violence, the chapter is an attemç)t to investigate the peculiar way in 
which the narrative operates in the construction o f the protagonist and the consequent 
problematic relation the film establishes with the spectator. Along the discussion, other 
critics’ analysis will be used whether to support or to dialogue with the ideas presented here. 
A greater attention is given to the writings o f Hans Feldman and Philip Kolker, both o f whom 
provide insightful interpretations o f the director’s films, with the caution o f avoiding as much 
as possible a restrictive view o f the works. Besides, the two critics-who adopt antagonistic 
positions in relation to A Clockwork Orange-iocm  on the ambiguity o f the cinematic text, 
which is the core o f the thesis as well. Also useful was the text by Paulo Menezes that offers a 
coimterpoint to Kolker’s argument against the absence o f a value judgement in the filnx In 
addition to that, I shall resort to authors such as Gérard Genette, Seymour Chatman and Sarah 
Kozloff in order to support the analysis, particularly in what concerns narrative problems, 
since most part o f the text concentrates on the roles o f the voice-over and the camera-narrator 
in the construction o f the identification which the film tries to establish between the 
protagonist and the spectator. I may also make references to the writings o f non-academic 
crititcs, like the already mentioned Fred Hechinger and Pauline Kael. These names were 
brought up here in order to offer a broader view o f the reception o f A Clockwork Orange, 
emphasising the turbulence the film caused in different areas. Hechinger and Kae, whose 
works are compromised with the media and the cinematic industry rather than with academia, 
produce texts which reflect more closer (and are more influent on) the taste o f the general 
public, reaching an audience who is not achieved by the theories o f the scholar.
Finally, in the Conclusion, the text reflects upon the implications o f the film’s 
ambiguity, considering the absence o f a moral position that could console the viewer with a 
secure interpretation o f the work. Also a brief comparison between the protagonist o f A 
Clockwork Orange and that o f another o f Kubrick’s film, namely Full Metal Jacket (1987),
gwill be employed in order to discuss the problems involved in the already mentioned 
identification process.
Chapter 1 
Kubrick’s Anti-Identity 
or 
How I Learn to Stop Worrying and Lx)ve Ambiguity
You write “bom to kill” in your helmet and 
you wear a piece botlom. Wlial’s that 
supposed to be, some kind of sick jdce? 
(...) I think I was trying to suggest 
something about the duality o f men. 
Sr.
What?
The duality o f men. Jungian thing. 
Sr.
(Pause)
Whose side are you, son?
Full Metal Jacket
1.0 Introduction
However different the approaches that Stanley Kubrick’s work has received firom the 
critics, there seems to be a consetisus among them in what concerns the classification o f 
Kubrick as an auteur. Even when the term is not mentioned explicitly, the idea that the 
diitctor belongs to that select group o f those who, among the proliferation o f names within 
the cinematic industry, can be called arlisl is an underlying assumption in nearly all the 
material written about him. Alexander Walker defined this characteristic mark as a 
“conceptual talent”, or the rare capacity o f developing a certain cinematic concept in every 
movie, elaborating his singular vision in such a peculiar way that each film becomes unique 
(9). García Mainar points Kubrick as “one o f the few ‘auteurs’ in contemporary cinema”, a 
director from whom “one could expect a relatively coherent filmography.” (4) Norman Kagan 
is more eloquent by stating that Kubrick is “the auteur critic’s dream”, thanks to his
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remarkable control over the film-making process, from the writing o f the script to the 
publicity. For Kagan, “his films are probably as close to personal works o f art as any in the 
commercial cinema.” (12)
Frequently compared to Coppola and Arthur Penn, Kubrick has been recognised as a 
fibnmaker who managed to combine the commercial success and a signature, thus refusing to 
make concessions to the industry (but not breaking with it) and developing a distinctive style. 
In A Cinema o f  Loneliness, Robert Kolker calls attention to the place occupied by directors like 
those in the history o f Hollywood film industry. After the crisis Hollywood faced in the 
1950’s-due, among other fectors, to the popularisation o f television and the threaten o f 
censorship during the McCarthyist years, with the black lists o f the HUAC (House o f Un- 
American Activities Committee)-the big studios ceased to be the support and security for the 
business, or “the centralized commxmity o f administrator and craftsmen who [could] be drawn 
upon from production to production.” (5) The context in which directors like Kubrick, Coppola 
or Scorcese are inscribed is one o f an apparent independence for the fihnmakers, since the 
studios are no longer a controlling entity. But associated to freedom, the change brought a 
greater responsibility for the individual productions, ft>r each film has to cope now with its 
own commercial risks, “The ‘new Hollywood’ is in feet the old Hollywood without security 
and without community. Money was still the beginning, middle, and end o f its existence, and 
therefore fear o f formal and contextual experiment in its creation reigns as strongly as ever.” 
(5) In those conditions, the directors who had the ambition to develop a personal style and 
carry out experimentation should do so within the constraints o f the economic structure. In 
order to survive in the business, they could not abandon the necessity o f profit. Such was the 
challenge imposed on Kubrick, who managed to conciliate the demands o f the industry with a 
conceptual project, creating pieces that could be at the same time box offices and great 
innovations in terms o f cinematic language, as 2001: A Space Odyssey.
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The idea that Stanley Kubrick is an auieur, then, is putative among critics. Since I 
agree with them as to the existence o f a signature, which means, a remarkable style linked to a
particular conception o f the world that identifies and is developed along Kubrick’s films, I will
/
take that as an assumption in my own analysis o f the director’s work. What needs to be defined 
at this point is, fiirst, the concept o f authorship adopted, and second, the elements in Kubrick’s 
work that characterises him as an auteur.
1.1 Notions o f authorship
Developed under the influence o f French structuralism, the term auleur as originally 
employed by French writers o f Cahiers du Cinéma did not only defined an individual who was 
responsible for the creation o f a film. More important than that, those critics-some o f them 
also directors-were involved in the project o f raising the status o f cinema as an art form that, 
despite being a collective production, should be used as a vehicle for personal expression. 
Partly driven by a discomfort that has always visited critics and filmmakers since the birth o f 
cinema. Cahiers members were moved by a desire to define the fi-ontiers between cinema and 
the other arts, and as Caughie puts it, “appealing for a cinema that was truly cinenmtic.” (35) 
The politique des auteurs, as the French called it, consisted o f a new posture in film criticism, 
one that concentrated on the expression o f the artist’s personality as a criterion for valuation. It 
is worth remembering, however, that the Cahiers never attempted a theory o f the auleur. The 
term auteur theory, which is largely used in English, is due to a (mis)translation by Andrew 
Sarris, in his 1960’s version o f the politique des auteurs.
Crucial for the Cahiers notion o f artistry is the distinction between auteur and metteur 
en scène, which, as Buscombe quotes, is developed by André Bazin in his review o f The Red 
Badge o f  Courage, in Cahiers no. 27. “Bazin distinguishes between Hitchcock, a true auteur, 
and Huston, who is only a metteur en scène, who has ‘no truly personal style’”, says
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Buscombe. “Huston merely adapts, though often very skilfully, the material given him, instead 
o f transforming it into something genuinely Ws own.” (23-4) Cahiers critics were reacting 
against the Iradiiion de la qualité, that dominated the French cinema in the 1950’s, with names 
such as Autant-Lara and Delannoy, “a tradition which gave the central creative role to the 
writers (...), whose work was mainly adaptations o f ‘quality’ novels, leaving to the directors 
the secondary role o f implementing their scenarios.” (Caughie 35) Moreover, they went against 
the grain o f traditional film criticism which, no longer disturbed by the question o f whether 
cinema was art but still caught by the paradox o f an art that was also industry, tended to value 
those films that were as fer as possible from the commercial cinema, mainly the European 
productions. Cahiers articles championed not only what is conventionally seen as “art film”, 
but also, and mainly, the great names o f Hollywood industry, such as Orson Welles and John 
Ford. In that sense, they adopted a rebellious posture, defying the common opposition between 
high culture and a less valuable popular one.
The politique des auteurs then, threatened the notion o f art as belonging to a 
transcendent realm, beyond “mundane affairs”, such as commercial profit. Nevertheless their 
belief in the individual talent risked to be another form o f essentialism, one that defended the 
artist as an “illuminated being”, or, as Buscombe defines, “the notion o f a ‘divine spark’ which 
separates o ff the artist from ordinary mortals, >\iiich divide the genius from the journeyman.” 
(24) Besides, as Caughie remarks, their political position was one o f indifference and 
abstention Abandoning the usual content based analysis, they concentrated their attention on 
the mise-en-scène, looking for the traces o f a personal style (36). The despise for political 
issues that could permeate the movies, and their focus on the “filmic aspects o f the film” 
brought to Cahiers critics the stigma o f reactionary formalists. About that, André Bazin was 
cautious enough to ponder: “the individual transcends society, but society is also and above all 
•within him. So there can be no definitive criticism which does not take into consideration the
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social determinism, the historical combination o f circumstances and the technical background 
which to a large extent determines it,” (qtd, in Buscombe 26)
The notion o f auteur, thus, as the Cahiers used it, presents obvious limitations. In the 
foUowii^ decades, the politique des auteurs was sutgect to appropriations and modifications 
that tried to adapt some o f those principles to a less radical approach to films. Edward 
Buscombe’s article Ideas o f  Authorship suggests that Bazin’s effort was not enough to firee 
criticism fi-om its conceptual bias, its view o f the artist as “an individual that transcends 
society.” For Buscombe, it was necessary to eliminate the dissociation o f the film and the artist 
firom the history o f cinema and fi’om the context o f production (32). What seems to have 
remamed o f auterism in more recent criticism is the idea that, as Norman Kagan puts it, a 
movie director has the same fireedom and authority o f a writer, a painter or other artists in the 
elaboration o f his creative product (11).
With the development o f post-structuralist thought, the idea o f authorship once 
defended by the modernist tradition (the politique des auteurs being only one branch o f it) 
was threatened. In the end o f the 1960’s, Roland Barthes’ article The Death o f the Author 
defends that the Author is a product o f modernity that emerged in the Middle Age and 
acquired prestige thanks to the indivkiualist ideology o f capitalism, Barthes attacks the critical 
tradition, which tends to focus on the person o f the Author in order to find an e5q>lanation to 
the text, therefore reducing its possibilities o f meaning: “to give a text an Author is to in ^ s e  
a limit on that text, to fiimish it with a final signified, to close the writing,” (212) According 
to Barthes, a text is not a linear sequence o f words leading to a final essence, but a “multi­
dimensional space in which a variety o f writings, none o f them original, blend and clash.” 
(211)
The idea that the author is a cultural-ideological construct returns with Foucault in 
What Is an Author? Less enthusiastic than Barthes, Foucault alerts that the supposed death
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o f the author announced by Barthes could be in fact only a change o f centres in which the 
author is replaced by other notions, such as the work or the writing, which, as much as the 
author, are not established units o f meaning, but concepts variable according to cultural 
values. He traces the history o f the author as a function o f discourse, pointing how the 
concept o f authorship changed in different periods untü acquiring the privileged position it 
came to occupy in the 20* century, and remarks how powerfiil is the author’s name as a 
value criterion to attribute status to a work within a particular society. For Foucault, the rules 
for the construction o f the author in modem literary criticism are derived from the Christian 
exegesis procedures to validate the authority o f a text: there should be a “constant level o f 
value” among the works o f the same author, a “conceptual or theoretical coherence”, a 
“stylistic unit” and historical coherence between the biography o f the author and the events 
mentioned in the texts (151).
Not surprisingly, these seem to be also the general criteria to name a filmmaker an 
auteur in the writings o f the Cahiers du Cinéma and subsequent supporters o f the politique 
des auteurs. In their effort to establish the identity o f cinema as an independent art form, and 
to find a parameter for aesthetic valuation based on the supposed specificity o f cinematic 
media, auteur critics brought to cinema the label, the guarantee certificate o f the work that 
already existed in other arts, which is, the name o f the author. Foucault exposes the fragility 
o f the author-function and insists, in chorus with Barthes, that the author’s name carries a set 
o f values-a mmiber o f characteristics, expectable themes and style-that tries to contain the 
flow o f meanings in a text, or, in his words, “the author is the principle o f thrift in the 
proliferation o f meaning.” (159) For Foucault, “the author does not precede the works, he is 
a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in 
short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free 
composition, decomposition, and recomposition o f fiction.” (159) But Foucault lucidly adds:
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“It would be pure romanticism, however, to imagine a culture in which the fictive would 
operate in absolutely free state, in which fiction would be put at the disposal o f everyone and 
would develop without passing through something like a necessary constraining figure.” 
(159)
1.2 Kubrick as an auteur
If there is no escape, then, what is left to the critics is the awareness o f their 
limitations and the wish to restrain as least as possible the flow o f meanings in a work. So, 
when I adopt the notion o f authorship I intend to take Stanley Kubrick’s name not as a label, 
but as a metonym to represent a group o f works produced by that director, that carry certain 
meanings in common and that are the product, among other things, o f the historical-cultural 
moment in which they are inscribed. What Kubrick, the artist, says about his own films only 
interests me if  it is at work in the films themselves, but then, if those elements are already in 
the films, the directors explanations about them are redundant and can be used but as 
illustrations.
Moreover, dealing with Stanley Kubrick’s works is particularly interesting 
considering the debate about authorship that I summarised above. Kubrick seems to occupy 
two antagonistic positions. One the one hand, he conquered a certain space within cinema 
industry that guarantees him not only the fi-eedom to develop his projects with little 
intervention o f the commercial demands but also the status o f auteur with all the weight it 
carries within it. On the other hand, Kubrick’s works seem to resist the containment implied 
by the name o f the author. For one perspective, the whole o f his work is highly 
heterogeneous. Unlike directors like Hitchcock or John Ford, his name cannot be connected 
to one single genre. From science fiction to war movies, including those fiims which hardly 
fit a generic classification, Kubrick moves through a variety o f genres and themes that
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troubles the work o f the critic who tries to force uniformity in the whole o f the director’s 
work.
In addition to that, what the many texts which analyse Kubrick’s productions under 
the influence o f auteur ideas seem to find in common among the movies is exactly the 
avoidance o f ready answers, a tendency toward ambiguity, producing meanings that escape 
clear-cut conclusions, or even a defined political-ideological stand. Films like 2001, A 
Clockwork Orange (1971) and Eyes Wide Shut (1999) disturbed the critics for the multitude 
o f interpretations they oflFer, and sometimes for the difficulty to find at least one. The 
position generally adopted in Kubrick’s films accords with the post-structuralist principle, 
underlying the writings o f Foucault and Barthes, that signification proliferates in the texts 
and that interpretations which search for essences or one hidden central message, tying the 
text to a closed meaning, eventually castrate their objects o f analysis. Kubrick seems to 
refiise the reductionist burden by denying or threatening a centre. According to Kolker, 
“Kubrick’s narrative work centrifugally. Parts o f the whole are delineated and then set 
outside a center never seen or defined, and therefore non-existent. Kubrick’s narrative are 
about the lack o f cohesion, center, community.” (81) What seems to unite Kubrick’s work, 
then, and confers on it the coherence sought by the critics rather than being one common 
meaning is the very instability o f meaning, creating perhaps not an identity but an anti­
identity, which means, an identity characterised by the escape from a precise definitioa
But even this tendency is fer fi-om being homogenous in the director’s filnwgraphy. 
Rather, it is developed in a continuous process. The films seem to present a movement 
toward polyvalence which begins with more traditional structures and characters in the films 
o f the 1950’s, such as Killer’s Kiss (1955), Paths o f  Glory (1957) and Spartacus (1960), 
gradually abandoning secure moral positions and characters easily identifiable as heroes to 
adopt a distant perspective, one that does not offer judgements, but leaves them open to the
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audience in loose ends never tied up. That same movement represents the refusal o f the 
identification strategies characteristic o f the apparatus o f mainstream cinema. As Mainar 
notices in his analysis o f Kubrick’s work, there is an “overall tendency to fevor the 
construction o f an external position for the viewer. The patterns o f  focalization exploit the 
films’ capacity to present the visual material as too spectacular or too mysterious for the 
viewer to identify with it.” (5) Kubrick’s films, particularly those produced since Lolita 
(1961), tend to reserve a distant standpoint for the spectator, adverse to an uncompromised 
engagement o f the viewer.
The matter o f identification strategies will be taken further in the analysis o f A 
Clockwork Orange, which is the focus o f this thesis. At this point, however, I will 
concentrate on films that can offer a general understanding o f the development o f Kubrick’s 
style before and after A Clockwork Orange, beginning with Dr. Strangelove or How I  
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, passing through 2001 and Kubrick’s last film 
Eyes Wide Shut. My purpose is to situate A Clockwork Orange in the broader context o f the 
director’s filmography, in dialogue with the other films, and to provide a brief view o f how 
the “lost o f a centre” takes form along his work, before analysing the specific case o f A 
Clockwork Orange, in which that absence o f an established moral stand, o f a centre, that is, 
is responsible for the construction o f a narrative that can lead to antagonistic-and sometimes 
rather problematio-interpretations, without compromising itself with any o f them.
1.3 Dr. Strangelove and the failure o f language
The initial project for Dr. Strangelove or How I  Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Bomb was not to produce a comedy. Based on the novel Red Alert, by Peter 
George, the fihn was supposed to be a tense and dramatic story about the extreme risks that 
the arms race posed to humanity. However, the absurdity o f the situation described was so
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acute that the stoiy became risible^ .^ Dr. Strangelove questions how far can nations go in the 
dispute for power, tracing a sinister prospect o f a civilisation in which greed and the 
incapacity to understand and accept the other obliterates humanitarian values and even 
existence itself.
During the Cold War, the American general Ripper (Sterling Hayden) goes crazy, 
driven by his anti-Communist paranoid, and orders a nuclear attack on USSR, The Soviets, 
however, have produced a w e ^ n  so powerful that it could destroy all human and animal 
life on the planet, producii^, as the Russian ambassador (Peter Bull) says “a cloud o f 
radioactivity that would circle the Earth for 93 years.” The Doomsday Machine, as it was 
called, was an automatic and irreversible super nuclear bomb. As soon as an attack was 
perceived in Russian territory, the weapon would trigger global destruction without the 
possibility o f human interference.
The film is a mark in Kubrick’s construction o f characters. Most o f the previous 
productions exhibited conventional heroes who stood for models o f conduct, as orators o f  
the principles defended in the film. Paths o f  Glory, for instance, is exemplary o f that trace. 
Colonel Dax (Kirk Douglas) is a lawyer and as so he is allowed to utter what could be only 
underlying ideas; “I can’t believe that the noblest impulse in man, that is, compassion for 
another, is completely dead here.” The despair expressed by Dax is coherent within the 
context o f a war in which enemy and allied are hardly distinguishable. But while the world 
has such men as Dax, there is still hope. He has principles, he believes in justice and in 
institutions, even though these beliefe are swallowed up by impotence in the end.
From the 1960’s on, however, the profile o f Kubrick’s characters change in direct 
proportion to the erosion o f that former hope. If Lollla already has in Humbert Humbert an 
atypical hero, Dr. Strangelove is the final abandoning o f aU heroism. The film does not have
Stanley Kubrick-A  Life in Pictures, by Jan Harlan (2001)
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a central character, nobody is able to solve the conflict, and nobody escapes the ridicule. The 
only character w^ ho tries to find coherence and keep seriousness is Mandrake (one o f the 
three roles performed by Peter Sellers), but he is caught up in a tangle o f bathetic situations 
which can only contribute to reinforce the stupidity o f the environment to which he belongs. 
Mandrake tries to convince general Ripper to cancel his order o f attack but his speech does 
not affect Ripper’s lunatic thought. He then tries to communicate to the American president 
(performed by the same Sellers), but now the obstacle is the rigidity o f the military structure, 
which seems to be beyond reasoning. In fact, sensible reasoning is exactly what does not 
exist in the fihn, or else, the film deals precisely with that lack o f sense. The idiocy o f a 
society that produces a weapon to destroy itself is revealed in the most trivial acts, like a 
phone call. Conversation is useless because words are impotent. As Kolker defends, “it is a 
film about language that creates its own destruction, its own death and the death o f the 
world.” (91)
The story is concentrated in three settings. With the exception o f a few external 
shots and the first appearance o f General Buck Turgdison (George. C. Scott) in his bedroom, 
the action takes place in the War Room, in General Ripper’s office, and ki the interior o f a 
B-52. All o f them are enclosed, claustrophobic spaces. And enclosed less by actual walls 
than by the inefficiency o f the communication they try to establish with each other and with 
the outside world. Although verbal language is insistently used, it seems that meaning is 
never achieved, as if words were “floating signifiers”. In one o f the most hilarious dialogues 
(actually, a monologue) o f the film, the American president tries to report to the Russian 
premier-who is drunk-the incident with general Ripper. After a long, banal and amiable 
greetmg, which carries a slightly sexual connotation, the president finally introduces the 
subject:
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Now, then, Dimitri, you know how we’ve always talked about the possibility 
o f something going wrong with the bomb. The bomb, Dimitri, the hydrogen 
bomb. Now, what happens is: one o f our base commanders, he had a sort of... 
well, he went a little funny in the head, you know, just a little funny. And he 
went and did a little siUy thing. Well, I tell you what he did. He ordered his 
planes to attack your country.
Language can mitigate the shock o f the information but not the information itself What was 
supposed to be an extremely serious talk between the leaders o f the two most powerful (and 
antagonistic) nations in the world looses completely its sense when it slides into a futile 
lovers-like argument: “Why do you think I’m calling you, just to say hello? O f course I like to 
speak to you! O f course I like to say hello! Not now, but any time, Dimitri.” The extravagant 
diplomacy is obviously incompatible with the seriousness o f the problem. The film satirises a 
civilisation to which the respect for human life is reduced to codes o f conduct and civility. 
When the values o f that civilisation are lost, meaning vanishes as well. Not coincidentally, 
trying to explain the origin o f his paranoia. Ripper attributes it to his realisation o f a “loss o f 
essence”, which for him is located in the contamination o f what he calls “our precious bodily 
fluids,”
The formalities o f the language are a surrogate for the lost centre. Language is a 
device to try to establish a logic, to fix a meaning, to find coherence in the crisis. It is at the 
same time insufiScient, for it never fills the gap o f significance, and excessive, because it 
produces no more than an accumulation o f empty forms. About Ripper’s discourse, Kolker 
reflects: “there is a perfectly logical movement to these words, just as there is perfectfy logical 
movement to the mechanism o f defence and retaliation that makes up the war machine. But 
the logic o f both is internal onfy: the forms are correct, but what the forms signify is illogical 
and destructive.” (95) The logic only exists inside that system o f rules, that syntax governed
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by intricate norms which is unable to produce a practical result other than destruction. 
Verbosity would not save the planet.
The choice o f the satirical mode to narrate the story is revealing o f at least three 
important traces o f the film. Satire, as Pasold puts it, is loaded with an inherent pessimism 
which is feh first in the absence o f heroes and then in the feet that it does not signal to a 
change in the world it portrays (48-9). In Dr. Strangelove, the fiiiitless verbal battle keeps 
going while the world is being destroyed. The last sequence shows the magnificent nuclear 
mushrooms growing slowly while a s’weet and joyous feminine voice sings “we’U meet again, 
don’t know where, don’t know when, but I know we’ll meet again some sunny day.” The 
song stands out people’s incapacity to perceive the magnitude o f the situation they created, 
reinforcing the disparity between words and concrete reality thoroughly presented in the film.
Pessimism is a remarkable trace o f Kubrick’s work. Although acquiring different 
faces, a feeling that civilisation has come to a cul-de-sac prevails in the films. Characters 
seem impotent before the adversities o f the world their discvirsive practices have helped to 
create. In Dr. Strangelove, more than in any o f the other movies, the result o f that 
contradiction is grievous. And yet, the film is extremely fimny. One o f the reasons why we 
can laugh at our own misfortune is that, unlike traditional melodrama, we do not get 
emotionally involved with the tragic aspect o f the story. As KoDcer states, satire provides “the 
distance needed to observe the process, it removes the barrier o f psychological realism” (99) 
and therefore “demands that we be observers and not ‘identify’ with the characters.” (100)
Dr. Strangelove, then, denies commotion and proposes analysis. The world as it is 
depicted in the film looks like a distorted mirror image o f a reality that is in feet shocking and 
sinister. Bravely released amid the collective hysteria o f the Cold War, the film vexed the 
Pentagon for its bruising attack to the bellicosity o f their international policy (and the Soviet’s 
as well), used to sustain another form o f fundamentalism which was the anti-Communist
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crusade. The film adopts a clear ^ d  secure moral positioo, which is also typical o f a satire. 
As Pasold says after Frye, the satirical work tends to be moralist (50), in the sense that it 
judges a certain behaviour on the grounds o f a specific right-and-wrong conception, implying 
the belief in a determined ideal o f correctness.
1.4 2007 -  The perpetual search
The beliefe, however, explode with the bomb by the end o f the film. In Kubrick’s 
next work, 2001-A Space Odyssey, the moral judgements, if  there is any, is thoroughly 
diffuse. Critics have taken pains to find a coherent interpretation for the enigmatic narrative o f 
the film, sometimes even forcing a solution. Feldman, for instance, in his anxiety to ejq)lain 
the meaning o f the monolith, says that “its appearance again at the deathbed o f the astronaut 
clearly [sic] suggests that the rebirth o f the human spirit will establish the species upon a 
broader spiritual basis than that upon which it had previously existed.” (15) If there is 
something clear about the monolith it is that it is not clear at all.
2001 is probably the most hermetic o f Kubrick’s films. The puzzling elements o f its 
highly symbolic narrative have generated a tauriber o f interpretations, sometimes clashing 
ones, which evolves around two main lioes, defined by Kagan as a poetic-scientific 
interpretation and the view o f the film as a new myth (176), The former sees the story as a 
review o f the evolutionist conceptions o f  the origins o f civilisation whereas the later would be 
concerned with the understanding o f fimdamental truths o f life and the universe. I want to 
suggest here one possible interpretation o f the film which transits between these two main 
streams, and since my purpose is to raise questions that can be enlightening for the coming
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analysis o f A Clockwork Orange, I will concentrate on one element o f the film, namely the 
figure o f the monolith as a representation o f ambiguity.
The story covers a time span o f about four million years in the history o f humanity, 
firom the primate man to the space colonisation, in chronological order, including what is 
probably the longest time ellipsis in the history o f fiction. The narrative is divided in three 
parts-The Dawn o f  Man, Mission Jupiter, and Jupiter and Beyond, each o f them punctuated 
by the appearance o f the monolith, an enigma that remains unresolved.
The Dawn o f Man presents human being in its primitive form, as the ape, still hardly 
distinguishable fi"om other species in what concerns their capacity to compete for survival in 
the ecosystem. The apes, integrated in their environment, seem to live in a state o f total 
present, or better, in an atemporal state, where notions like past, present and future do not 
exist. Life consists in keeping on living, in trying to provide food and shelter, their defence 
against the adversities o f the environment lies in their gregariousness.
That is so until the interference o f a new force. After finding the monolith, the ape 
has the first insight that will not only mark its difference firom the other species but will 
constitute its power over them. The moment the ape discovers that the bone o f a dead animal 
can be used first as a tool to acquire food and then as a weapon to guarantee its protection, 
that is, the moment the ape discovers its potential violence, history begins. Both nourishment 
and protection are associated with the power to kill and to dominate the other. The monolith 
works as a catalyst that originates the notion o f time, since it is only after that first insight that 
the ape is able to interfere in its environment and to start the process that in the film 
culminates in hunaan’s colonisation o f this and other planets. Violence, thus, is neither good 
nor evil, it is both. It is a form o f energy, a propelling force that initiates the process o f 
evolution.
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Moreover, in the ape’s vision o f that first bone weapon the primary principle that 
characterises the civilisation to come is delineated: the one who is most powerfixl imposes its 
will on others. When the two groups o f apes fece each other to compete for water, what could 
be suggested is that power is external to individuals, it lies in the supplement, the accessory. 
The apes are equal, it is the equipment that makes them different. Power, then, is directly 
connected to technology.
The direction humanity took after the ape’s discovery is one o f sophistication o f the 
early weapon and domestication o f the primary urges. The necessity o f food and shelter is still 
the underlying motivation o f human actions but the brutality o f that first act is disguised by an 
apparatus o f civility which is very weU represented, as Feldman notices, in the repeated 
scenes o f meals. Feldman compares the scenes o f eating in 2001 in order to suggest how man 
has tamed his instincts but, at the same time, how the means he used to do it showed to be 
fi*agile. The ape’s brutal act o f eating contrasts radically with the synthetic food served to the 
astronauts-boxes o f rations or shapeless pastes, apparently with no appeal to the senses, 
which fulfil the need for nourishing but disconnect it from the pleasure that could be 
perceived in the ape’s devouring another animal’s meat-and finally with the final scene in 
which Bowman, the surviving astronaut (performed by Keir Dullea), dines ceremoniously at 
an IS*^  century table. For Feldman the scenes state that “the acquisition o f food [is] the primal 
need o f the instinctual man.” (14) Humankind has transformed the act o f eating into a ritual, 
cleaning it from its barbarism and as a consequence, humans distanced themselves from their 
origins and became mechanised.
When the monolith reappears after being buried for four million years, civilisation 
has to face an element that connects it to its genesis, a mark that brings back that violent force 
which provoked the whole process from the bone to the spaceship, an element that had been 
disguised, but was always there nevertheless. The gestures o f the researchers touching the
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monolith in a mix o f curiosity and fear mimics that o f the ^ e s . Both are ignorant o f the 
power, at once productive and destructive, embodied in that piece, and for both, the monolith 
is beyond understanding. As it is said in the recorded message in the Discovery, “its origin or 
purpose is still a total ntystery.”
The second confrontation with the monolith, and the previous one as well, represents 
a crisis. The process o f humanisation initiated with the first bone-weapon has come to a point 
o f retrogression when civilisation becomes so sophisticated that it ends up in sterility and 
humanity then turns into non-humanity. Relations between people are generally restricted to 
formalities. The prolix language experienced in Dr. Sirangelove gives place here to a 
disturbing silence. O f the one hundred and forty minutes o f film, approximately only forty are 
filled with dialogues, and those are often mediated by artificial resources or are direct 
interaction between man and machine.
But the most striking o f the contradictions o f civilisation is the figure o f the super­
computer HAL9000. The conçuter represents the point at which the boundary between 
human and machine blurs, as much as the difference between the ape and the other animals 
was blurred in the beginning. One o f the astronauts says about HAL; “whether or not he has 
real feelings is something I don’t think anyone can answer,” He is, nevertheless, the only 
character, after the apes, who e)q)resses emotions. HAL is the most charismatic figure in the 
film. As Mainar observes, “HAL is given the capacity to focalize internally” (129), a resource 
that helps to promote identification with the audience. Besides, he uses language to 
manipulate and deceive, he shows pride and resentment, he implores for mercy before death, 
showing therefore, a more humanised behaviour than any actual human character. When the 
con^uter kills the sleeping members o f the crew, their death is informed by a succession o f 
digital messages: “Computer malfijnctioning. Life fiinctions critical Life functions 
terminated.” When HAL is disconnected, we hear: “Stop, Dave. I’m afraid. I’m afi^d, Dave.
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Dave, my mind is going, I can feel it.” “I can feel it”, he insists many times, as to convince us 
o f a genuine em otioa Then he starts to say nonsense, loosing consciousness, and smgs a love 
song until his voice silences completely.
Mainar states that HAL’s disconnection represents the end o f our conception o f 
logic. After that, Dave Bowman, the remaining astronaut, will enter a voyage, the meaning o f 
which our system o f thought is incapable to grasp (130). In this kind o f new dimension in 
which his journey ends, the notion o f chronological time seems to vanish agaia There, in a 
room decorated in a mix o f styles from several periods, Bowman meets himself in different 
stages o f what should be his life to come: as an old man having his meal, and as a moribund 
in his deathbed. Although joined in the same space, all o f them seem lonely, isolated. Then, in 
the middle o f the room, the monolith appears for the last time.
The final shot shows a foetus floating in space, an image that has suggested to some 
critics, like Feldman, Mainar and Kolker, the indication o f a positive prospect for humanity, 
since the starchild would signal to the possibility o f rebirth as an affirmation o f life. Feldman 
and Polo see 2001 as a theological film, stating the presence o f a superior intelligence, a god­
like or extra-terrestrial entity materialised by the monolith. For Polo, particularly, the end o f  
the film would indicate that man achieved a state o f self-sufBciency, becoming himself his 
own god (115-6).
The film sustains that and other quite different interpretations. What I would like to 
emphasise here is the element o f ambiguity which characterises 2001 probably more than any 
o f other Kubrick’s work. From this perspective, the end o f the film could point to a new 
beginning, yes, but instead o f being positive or negative, it would stand beyond value 
judgement, representing life as an endless cycle that succeeds itself and will always 
encon^)ass elements that cannot be grasped. That would be, then, an acceptance o f the 
vinavoidable ambivalence o f human nature.
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In that context, the figure o f the monolith may be not only ambiguous, but it may be 
ambiguity itself represented a material, very concrete object, whose shape, texture and 
volume can be perfectly perceived by the senses and described by verbal language so that 
there is no doubt o f its existence. And yet, that dark, plane and solid piece is difiiise and 
uncontainable. Just like the film. Probably never again would Kubrick take ambiguity so 
fiirther in his work, I mentioned earlier the word hermetic to refer to 2001. 1 would like now 
to rectify that affirmation, for if  hermetic means something closed, sealed, then that word is 
thoroughly vmsuitable, 2001 offers a multitude o f interpretations, taking to extremes the idea 
o f openness in a work o f art.
1.5 Eyes Wide Shut -  Reconciliation with ambiguity
The next movie I will discuss was first released in 1999, that is, more than thirty 
years after 2001. Coincidentally the last work in the career o f the director, Eyes Wide Shut 
was included here because it can offer an interesting view o f what direction Kubrick’s work 
took after that change in the movies o f the 1960’s. I would like to provide a brief view o f  
where that trajectory toward ambivalence has led, since this film, as much as the others 
discussed here, has generated very contradictory responses thanks to its metaphorical and 
sometimes imconventional elements. Here, again, ambiguity seems to play a major role.
The legitimacy o f institutions is a theme that marks Kubrick’s work as whole. The 
army, the government, the feraily, the main segments that constitute the pillars o f Western 
civilisation were subject to analysis (and not sinq)ly to attack) in films like Paths o f  Glory, 
Full Metal Jacket and Barry Lindon (1975), which put into questions the validity o f moral 
values and social codes. In the case o f Eyes Wide Shut, the lens turn to the microcosm o f 
private life (although never loosing sight o f its connection with the broader social sphere).
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Like an adult fairy tale, the movie narrates, through a number o f apparently absurd 
situations, the process by which Bill Harford (Tom Cruise) discovers the contradictions o f  
human nature and society. Leading a seemingly perfect life, Bill is shaken by his wife’s 
sudden revelation o f her desire for a stranger. Disturbed by the thoughts that this declaration 
brought to him, he enters a dream-like journey o f one night in which he meets a number o f  
bizarre characters and is presented with situations that test his certainties and expose the 
frailty o f his morality, threatening the stability o f his world.
As I have mentioned before, it is characteristic o f Kubrick’s style to subvert the 
traditional strategies o f identificatfon, as if refusing to offer the audience a passive acceptance 
o f the universe narrated, denying the viewer an unreflected emotional engagement in the 
story. In Eyes Wide Shut, Bill Harford is a personification o f  an ideal hero o f Western 
capitalist society: he is young, handsome, rich, happily married to a pretty woman, successful 
in one o f  the most respected careers, that o f a doctor, and lives in the most important 
metropolis o f the West, that is New York. Apparently, he is also a man o f solid moral 
principles, his discourse reproduces word by word the ideals o f political correctness o f the 
society to which he belongs. He is also, o f course, absolutely boring. M  a reverse o f what 
hi^pens in A Clockwork Orange, where identification strategies are ençloyed in fevour o f a 
reproachfiil character, in Eyes Wide Shut the ^parent perfection o f the hero soimds naïve and 
arrogant, and he is presented as a figure with whom one can hardly identify.
BiU has constructed an ideal image o f himself in which he strongly believes and 
which is the sustaining force o f his relationship to the world. His discourse is constituted o f a 
collection o f clichés and, as the characters in Dr. Strangelove, he reproduces a sterile 
language that tries to organise the contradictions o f human nature and society in the rigidity o f  
its conventions. More than anything, it is the manifestation o f desire that provokes the break
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in his beliefs. Desire will be Bill’s monolith, the destabilising element that provokes the crisis 
which enables him to enter a process o f niaturation.
At a party, in the beginning o f the fihn. Bill and his wife Alice (Nicole Kidman) are- 
each one on their own-confronted with desire in different forms. The process o f  
deconstruction o f beliefs for Bill is announced in the narrative when he meets an old friend 
from the medical school who had quitted college to pursue a difficult musical career. For the 
doctor, the pianist’s choice is inconceivable, since his idea o f self-fiilfilment is based on social 
status and capital accumulation rather than on personal satisfection. Bill imcritically accepts 
the standard conception o f success defended in the competitive capitalist society to which he 
is integrated. “I never really understood why you walked away”, says Bill with a badly 
disguised superiority feeling, and Nick answers: “No? It’s a nice feeling, I do it once in a 
while.” That feeling does not belong to Bill’s repertoire.
But it is desire in its sexual connotation that takes a major role in the story, or better, 
human’s difficulty to deal vwth desire in a highly institutionalised social structure which 
regulates and tries to contain it in a set o f norms that eventually M  to repress the ambivalent 
power o f desire. Marriage is, for sure, the strongest effort o f society in that direction.
Bill’s wife, Alice, seems to be suspicious o f what he still ignores, that is, both the 
fragility o f conventions and the complexity o f the world they try to tame. In her flirtatious 
dialogue with a gallant Hungarian, many o f the questions o f the film are stated. Initially, 
trying to impress Alice, the man mentions Ovid and his writings on “the art o f love”, to which 
she answers: “Didn’t he wined up all by himself, crying his eyes out, in some place with very 
bad climate?” A first incoherence o f love is revealed in this dialogue: all the knowledge about 
love-and also desire, we could add-does not free a person from the pain it causes. One can 
never folly know the feeling and, therefore, cannot control it.
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If the logic o f his flirt does not function, the man tries then to dismantle the logic o f 
her resistance. In order to dismiss her excuse o f being married, he defends that the reason why 
women got married in ancient times was that matrimony “was the only way they could loose 
their virginity and be free to do what they wanted with other man, the ones they realty 
wanted.” Denying a romantic view o f marriage as an union o f sincere feelings, the 
Hungarian’s provocation reinforces the artificial character o f marriage as a formal contract 
necessary for the functioning o f  a structure grounded in repression and hypocrisy, disguised in 
the belief in fidelity. Later on he adds; “Don’t you think one o f the charms o f marriage is that 
it makes deception a necessity for both parts?’ For that system o f norms to fijnction, then, it is 
necessary to transform matrimonial life in a performance. According to that structure, a 
successfiil marrii^e is one in which husband and wife manage to pretend to believe each 
other. Fidelity and monogamy, then, seem to be not matters o f  feelings but o f business, 
necessary principles for the administration o f  an institution.
That can be a conclusion for the Hungarian’s discourse, but not necessarily for the 
film. His malicious cynicism takes the form o f a serene acceptance o f the complexity o f 
human relationships on the part o f Alice and o f a traumatic process o f acknowledging that 
conqjlexity on the part o f Bill. The set o f  principles and moral codes o f Western capitalist 
civilisation which Bill has elected to be his centre and to orient his life, protecting him from 
errors, shows to be inefficient. His belief in that constraining morality prevents him from 
perceiving it as a social construction and to defend himself in situations in which those values 
feil to save him. He is then confronted with the idea o f entrapment in his sudden realisation 
that civilisation is defeated the same structure it has created. The nwrnent he feces that 
contradiction the centre erodes, for the centre does not admit doubt. Its existence implies that 
one believes it and therefore, when it shows to be M ible, it ceases to be a centre. Bill will
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have to leam how to survive in a decentred world, where truths are not absolute, meanings are 
not fixed, rules are flexible.
The couple’s final conversation suggests a conciliatory position in relation to the 
problem o f ambiguity, which in this case refers to marriage but which could be easily applied 
to the institutions in general. When Bill, still insisting in finding a solution, asks “Alice, what 
do you think we should do?” he gets as an answer her melancholic acceptance o f the 
unavoidable instability to which they are subject. Alice repeatedly remarks the non-existence 
o f certainties, o f definite answers; no, there is nothing to do about what happened; no, she 
cannot be sure o f even that; no, they will no longer believe the word “forever”. “But”, she 
adds, “I do love you, and, you know, there is something very important that we need to do as 
soon as possible.” She explains; “Fuck.” End o f the story.
That conclusion seems to be a forsaking o f metaphysics. In 2001 humanity was 
condemned to a search for answers it never finds. In Eyes Wide Shut we realise that there is no 
answer, that life is about maintaining the belief in what one knows to be a feilure-in this case, 
marriage and other social institutions. And, as nothing solves the contradictions, it is better to 
accept them, what in that particular context means to forget explanations and succxmib to 
desire. The conclusion o f the film could hardly be called optimistic, but it could be a 
suggestion that it is possible to survive within the entrapment, if one becomes conscious o f it. 
That is exactly what does not happen in Dr Sirangelove, for instance, where people destroy 
themselves and the world without realising the whole absurdity o f the situation they have 
created. I f in 2001 man was perplex before the ambiguity o f his own nature, in Eyes Wide 
Shut people are at least offered a possibility o f understanding. Only the answer they find does 
not fit the question they made.
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1.6 Conclusion
The trajectory towards ambiguity that can be perceived in Kubrick’s work, then, is 
connected to the fell o f beliefe and secure moral positions, the loss o f centres. The pessimism 
that permeated the thematic o f early films like Paths o f  Glory, characterised by the isolation 
o f man and his impotence before the crisis o f the civilisation he constructed, invades the 
structure o f the narrative in Dr. Strangelove. The disappearance o f the hero and the non­
resolution o f the conflict in that film marks a turning point in Kubrick’s filmogr^hy. From 
then on, the play with cinematic language to produce narratives that discuss not only the 
ambiguities o f human nature but also the very ambiguity o f a work o f art will be a tendency 
intensely persecuted. Not that the previous films did not present traces o f such a tendency, but 
it acquired a more visible form since Dr. Strangelove.
Taking to extremes the idea that civilisation produces the means for its own 
destruction. Dr. Strangelove presents characters that, despite being victimised by their 
ambiguous power, are not able to recognise it. 2001, by locating the origin o f the civilisation 
which coUapses in the previous fiilm, seems to perceive in the primitive man the force that is 
at once productive and destructive, the force that wiU lead humankind to its future o f 
sophistication and dehumanisation, that will domesticate the instincts and primal needs by 
^ n fin in g  them to rituals and norms o f behaviour. The man presented in 2001h confronted 
with his ambiguous nature and with the questions he cannot explain in different periods o f  
history. But his reaction to this confrontation tends to reach perplexity, rather than action.
Finally, in Eyes Wide 5^M/-particularly in the case o f Alice, since up to the end Bill 
naively insists in establishing truths-people seem to have come to a more mature state, one 
that allows them to recognise those contradictory forces that govern their nature and to 
perceive the weaknesses o f the social structure they have constructed and now he^ to sustain. 
That process o f recognition could be a first step to create a less authoritarian world, one that
could keep its social codes and institutions, but would use them with awareness o f their 
weaknesses.
That is probably the closest Kubrick comes to presenting an alternative to the 
isolation o f humankind and the crisis o f civilisation. In A Cinema o f  Loneliness, Philip KoDcer 
names Kubrick an anti-humanist, complaining o f his refuse to offer a way out o f the
V oppressive order civilisation established for the world: “Kubrick perceives individuals and 
groups assuming a helpless and inferior position with respect to an order they themselves have 
created. But Kubrick does not go beyond anti-humanism to embrace another social or 
philosophical order, for he does not see the possibility o f men or women regaining control 
^ v er  their selves and their culture.” (77) The text, published in the early 1980’s, had not the 
chance to consider the later films, but, had it happened, its conclusion probably would not 
change that much. As the same Kolker affirms along his text, Kubrick is not revolutionary in 
the sense o f suggesting radical solutions to the reality he portrays. In feet, he does otherwise, 
reaffirming a disbelief in radical solutions, and proposing that we should learn how to live 
, within the inevitably problematic world we have produced.
Neither is he revolutionary in relation to the cinematic industry. Being acclaimed as a 
genius, he is, nevertheless, a genius within the boundaries o f Hollywood. He certainly 
diverges firom the great industrial productions, specially in the atten^rt to reveal rather than to 
hide the cinematic language, promoting a distance between film and spectator that denies the 
viewer a passive identification with story and characters. But his artistry is also remarkable 
for his capacity to develop disturbing narratives by employing and refining the techniques and 
resources o f classical cinema.
In the next chapter I will analyse how those techniques are applied in A Clockwork 
Orange, a film that occupies a peculiar place in the trajectory o f ambiguity that I summarised 
up to now. More than refusing those traditional strategies o f identification, the film plays with
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them, promoting a game o f involvement and detachment that is feh not only in the structure o f 
the narrative, but also in the elements o f the mise-en-scene and editing. By creating a 
protagonist that is both evil and attractive, and avoiding moral judgements in a story that deals 
with problematic issues like violence, Kubrick produced that which came to be his most 
controversial work.
35
Chapter 2 
A Clockwork Orange 
And 
The Nightmare o f the Spectator
It’s funny how the colours of the real wwld only seem 
really real when we viddy than o t the screen 
A Clockwork Orange
2.0 Introduction
The pathway to ambiguity that could be perceived in Kubrick’s trajectory finds its 
most problematic moment in ^  Clockwork Orange (henceforth ACO), The pessimistic view of 
humankind in fece o f civilisation that leads to the loss o f centre and is reflected in a narrative 
form that fevours ambiguity and avoids value judgement is also present in this film, and so is 
Kubrick’s peculiar mode o f dealing with distance and identification. But for different reasons, 
ACO  was received with a discomfort that goes beyond the difficulty to find meanmgs. The 
negative reactions to the film reflect a moral concern, much more than the estrangement 
before an unfemiliar aesthetics. Particularly in the United Kingdom-where the attacks were so 
violent that Kubrick, supported by Warner Brothers, forbade the exhibition and distribution- 
the movie seems to have become the target o f a moral crusade. The press initiated a nearly 
hysterical can5 )aign that associated ACO  to supposedly copycat crimes committed by the 
youth in England, and it did not take long until Kubrick was ejqplicitly accused o f murder^ .^
For more information on the topic, see the testimony of Christiana Kubrick, the director’s wife, in the 
documentary Stanley Kubrick -  A life  in Pictures, by Jan Harlan (2001).
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Yet, it would be too easy to attribute the uneasiness which the film provokes to the 
fact that it is a violent naovie. ACO  remains impressive even for a. 21*^  Century viewer, for 
whom violence is a routine both in fiction and in daily life. Explosions, serial murdering, 
sexual abuse are accessible to anyone who dares to spend her or his aftemoons in fi-ont o f a 
TV set. Something differentiates ACO. Its violence is not o f the same sort o f that which we 
are used to watch in any commercial movie. The violence in ACO is much closer to that 
which one might find in David Lynch’s Blue Velvet (1986), or more recently (and more 
extremely) in Michael Haneke’s Funny Games (1997), films that are aggressive in 
themselves, in the threaten they represent to the spectator’s passivity. It is not simply the 
violence that is practised by and against characters in the story that is disturbing, but it is the 
violence that is practised against the viewer. Something in the fihn does not allow us to 
surrender to contemplation, it violates the stability o f our experience as spectators. The film 
wounds something intimate.
2.1 ^  Clockwork Orange -  A summary
Based on the homonymous and also polemic novel by Anthony Burgess, ACO  takes 
place in a near fiiture (never specified), in an urban centre (generally identified as London). 
The film, like the novel, is the story o f Alex, an adolescent for whom rape and Beethoven’s 
symphonies offer equally intense pleasures. Leader o f a gang who practises violence as 
entertainment, Alex takes the profile o f non-conventional heroes that people Kubrick’s 
filmography up to the edge o f the morally unbearable.
After spanking a woman to death (the “Cat Lady”, performed by Miriam Karlin), the 
protagonist is betrayed by his partners (or droogs, in nadsal slang) and is caught by the police. 
He is condenmed to 14 years, but his sentence is interrupted when, after two years in jail, he is 
chosen as guinea pig in an experiment that aims at eradicating criminality, so that the State
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prison vacancies can be filed up with political prisoners. The experiment is the Ludovico 
Tecnique, a brutal conditioned-reflex therapy which consists o f intensively exposing the 
individual to images o f violence while special drugs administered to him provoke a strong 
feeling o f sickness. The final result is the association o f human violent and erotic instincts or 
thoughts to a physical suffering so extreme that the individual becomes incapable o f any kind 
o f aggression and inapt for sexual practice. As a collateral damage o f the therapy, Alex can no 
longer bear Beethoven’s Ninlh Symphony as well, since it was played as soundtrack for the 
violent images in the treatment. He is, therefore, deprived o f his main sources o f pleasure.
Once set fi’ee, Alex finds himself in the position o f a victim within his former 
imiverse. He then feces the revenge o f the ones he once victimised in a nightmare-like 
trajectory that ends up at HOME, the house o f a writer whose wife was raped by Alex and his 
droogs in an attack that led her to death and made the writer parafytic and psychologically 
disturbed. Alex is not recognised at first, and receives the protection o f the writer, who 
intends to use his drama as anti-government propaganda. But the boy involuntarily denounces 
himself when he chants Singing in the Rain, the same song he had intoned while raping the 
man’s wdfe. The writer, then, tortures him by playing the Ninth, up to the point that he tries to 
commit suicide. When he recovers consciousness, the effects o f the conditioning have been 
reverted and Alex’s case has raised a passionate debate in the media. He is now going to be 
willingly used by authorities, which try to recuperate the public support.
2.2 Criticism on the Orange
Some critics seem to take ACO  as an insult, ofiensive as a bad joke. Their aggressive 
negative reaction to it is not simply aimed at the violence o f Alex’s odyssey, but at the 
particular way in which the story is rendered, as Menezes puts it, “by means o f an absolutely
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embarrassing ambiguity.”*'* (63) Jackson Burgess, on Film Quarterly, for instance, argues that 
instead o f unsettling the viewer, as he has done in the previous films, Kubrick would be now 
“merely trying to hurt.” (35) Although he recognises a technical excellence in the movie and 
behaves much fevourably towards Kubrick’s previous works, J. Burgess seems puzzled by the 
seemingly amoral posture o f this film, by its striking refuse to offer moral judgements. For the 
critic, Kubrick would have M ed in his attempt to construct a satire o f our civilisation, 
because, differently fi-om Dr. Strangelove, ACO  is a satire without a moral centre. Moreover, 
the director’s critique toward totalitarianism-which J. Burgess understands as the ultimate 
theme o f the film-would have M en in its own trap. According to him:
In morals, as in politics, human beings with fescinating regularity turn themselves 
into the thirds they hate, and something o f the sort has happened to Kubrick in 
this film. The technique o f the picture is the technique o f brain washing: 
emotional manipulation in the most visceral level o f feeling. The dynamics o f the 
film is the dynamics o f  totalitarianism: all choices and values are derived fi-om 
fear. (35)
The film would be totalitarian in the sense that its narrative pushes the audience to an 
identification with a protagonist who is a threaten to the moral values o f society, who 
represents disorder and incarnates the inner fears o f the pacific and politically correct citizea  
Not that this identification is necessarily accon5)lished. This is a process that depends too 
much on individual viewers’ subjectivity and it is not the mm o f this work to go that fiirther. 
But the film does suggest that identification, it deploys a number o f devices to promote 
intimacy between Alex and the hypothetical spectator, to present the protagonist as an 
enq)athetic character no matter how vicious he is and, against that, the viewer indeed has no 
choice. In the words o f Philip Kolker: “The film gives every indication that we must admire
In the original: “... por meio de uma ambigüidade absolntamente constrangedora” (my translation)
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Alex and admire him with little hesitation. It therefore becomes exploitative o f its audience in 
the worst way.” (121)
Kolker, who tends to be as impartial and cautious as possible in his analysis o f the 
director’s other films, makes no effort to mask his discontentment with ACO, and defines: “If 
Dr. Strangelove is satirical and 2001 contemplative, A Clockwork Orange is cynical. There 
 ^are no honest or even responsible answers to the problems it poses.” (117) Farther on he adds: 
“Judgement is rendered diflScult, and the film, finally, can be seen as a cynical manipulation 
o f its audience. It is a cynicism that indicates Kubrick had become ready to allow his audience 
to wallow in its own worst instincts or that he simply did not have an adequate understanding 
o f the problem. Or that he didn’t care.” (123)
Even among critics who present more fevourable views o f ACO, or the ones who 
adopt a seemingly neutral and descriptive point o f view, the proliferation o f meanings derived 
fi*om the absence o f an orienting moral position is addressed as a major force in the film. 
Putting together 2001, A Clockwork Orange and Barry Lyndon, Feldman defends the idea that 
those movies compose “a trilogy on the moral and psychological nature o f Western man and 
on the destiny o f his civilisation.” (12) According to the critic, the point o f Kubrick’s trilogy 
is that civilisation is founded in an erroneous conception o f human nature, which therefore 
leads it to collapse. Furthermore, the critic defends that the lasic assumption o f 2001 is that 
cultural forms and social institutions M ed to “provide man with the significant order that 
^lakes life a meaningfiil experience” (15), and that A Clockwork Orange and Barry Lyndon 
discuss exactly the relation between those decadent cultural forms and institutions and 
himiankind in its search for self-e)q)ression. Feldman places Kubrick in the context o f post- 
Nietzchean, post-Freudian and post-Einsteinian thought, which no longer follows the 
Christian ideal o f man as a “supreme creation o f God”, but questions the nature and the 
validity o f human existence. Feldman points HAL9000, Alex and Redmond Barry (the
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protagonist o f Barry Lyndon) as a “trio o f modem heroes”, who are ironically “the most 
human characters in their enviroxmient”. The intriguing ambiguity o f ACO, therefore, would 
^be a reflex o f the erosion o f valu^ experienced by society. The loss o f centre that can be 
perceived in the narrative would be a formal representation o f a crisis that takes place ki the 
external world and consequently in the fiction that deals with it.
Instead o f soimding immoral (or amoral) to critics like Feldman, the fact that the film 
does not judge Alex seems to represent a trace o f maturity. Menezes suggests that by 
depriving the viewer from the moral parameter we need in order to establish a comfortable 
answer for the film, Kubrick could be “showing that it is up to us, according to our own 
values, to take the ultimate responsibility o f adopting a position before that multiplicity o f 
possibilities that is indiscriminately presented to us.”*^  (63) Moreover, the critic defends that 
ACO  is a visual questioning o f the order o f things that we take as given in our society. Being 
amoral himself Alex would make us reflect upon the validity o f the pillars o f our own moral
positions; “By showing someone with apparently no value, Kubrick forces us to re-evaluate
/
 ^ the values that guide our own conduct and its homogénisation.”^^  (78) Thus, rather then 
insulting the audience, the film would be provoking it, attributing the viewer more 
responsibility than his or her activity o f spectator usually demands.
2.3 Narrative ambiguity
As I have stated, the aim o f the present thesis is to anafyse the construction o f  
ambiguity in the narrative o îA  Clockwork Orange, I defend that the absence o f a centre that is 
developed along Kubrick’s filmography culminates in ACO with the creation o f an amoral 
character, that is Alex, to whom is given the control o f the narrative, producing, therefore, an
‘X—) Kutdck mostra que cabe a nós mesmos a respcaisabilidade últiina de tomar uma posição frente àquela 
multiplicidade que nos é apresoitada de maneira indiscriminada, s^uindo e s^;undo nossos pn^rios \^ores.” 
“Ao nos mostrar alguém aparaitemente sem valores, Kuhick acaba nos fc»’çando a reavaliar os valores que 
orientam a nossa própria conduta e sua homogeneização.”
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also amoral story. In a selection o f scenes, I analyse the mechanisms that operate in the 
relation o f identrfication-detachment that the film promotes, which is essential to create the 
effect o f compromisin^g the viewer with Alex.
In the numerous analysis o f the film, the ambiguity o f the narrative and the film’s 
constant play with the spectator’s identification and estrangement towards the protagonist 
stand out as the main concerns o f the critics. The means by which the film constructs these 
traces are various but one device in the narrative shows itself to be o f remarkable inertance: 
that o f the verbal narrator. The power that the narrative confers to Alex allows him to be a 
controller o f the information rendered, subjecting the viewer to his knowledge, to his 
perspective, and to his style. Alex’s role is doubly inçortant, because he is at once the 
character that filters the story within the fictional world, and the narrator who reports it firom 
outside. As a filter, he acts as a “psychological or emotional channel” through which the 
information flows (Stam 94), and in this case, as Chatman defines, images are filtered through 
the character’s perceptual consciousness, in such a way that the film “deftly lock[s] the 
audience into a character’s perception.” (157)
In Burgess’ original novel, it is an older Alex that reports his adventures. According 
to Gérard Genette’s distinction between story and discourse (25-29), the space and time to 
which this narrator belongs is different firom that in which the story took place. That means, 
Alex-narrator teUs in the time/space o f the discourse the events that Alex-character lived in 
the time/space o f the story. And as it typically occurs in a first-person narrative, the 
presentation o f the fects is restricted to the perspective o f the narrator. In ACO, the narrative 
obeys Alex’s world view and his perception o f the events-as narrator and as filter. The effect 
o f this device is that violence is presented according to Alex’s understanding o f it, 
ençhasising not the horror o f brutality but the protagonist’s amusement in executing and
42
reporting his acts. To a certain extent, Alex’s pleasure in practising violence can be more 
shocking than violence itseH  ^as it happens in the follovving fragment:
Georgie let go o f holding his goobers [Ups] ^art and just let him have one in the 
toothless rot [mouth] with his ringy fist, and that made the old veck [man] start 
moaning a lot then, then out comes the blood, my brothers, real beautifiiL So aU 
we did then was to pull his outer platties [clothes] ofi^  stripping him down to his 
vest and long underpants (very starry [old]; Dim smacked [laughed] his head off 
near), and then Pete kicks him lovely in his pot [beUy], and we let him go (9-10). 
The choice for a character-narrator is essential to the creation o f the contrast between the 
intimacy that the narrative promotes towards Alex and the distance with which violence is 
presented, not only in the novel but also (and maybe still more) in the cinematic text.
But there are still other intriguing aspects in this narrator’s discourse, which applies 
both for the novel and for the film. His speech reproduces a colloquial language and he 
addresses the viewer (and the reader, when it concerns the novel) in a rather familiar and 
fiiendly feshion, making use o f expressions such as “my friends”, “my brothers” or referring 
to himself as “your humble narrator”. Such a register attributes an informal tone to the 
narrative. Besides, by acknowledging the presence o f an audience and directly addressing it, 
the film demands participation and implicates approbation from the viewer, it promotes 
intimacy between narrator and spectator and, as Kozloff argues, places us in the 
uncomfortable position o f accomplices o f Alex’s ultra-violent acts (50). The narration is 
loaded with irony. When Alex makes us aware o f our condition o f audience and takes our 
acceptance for granted, he seems to violate our space, and the film, then, demechanicises our 
experience as viewers.
Nevertheless, in the novel, the approximation reader/narrator is broken the 
strangeness o f the vocabulary. Anthony Burgess creates in the novel a whole new dialect-
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mainly inspired by Russian language, but also by gypsy talk-that is practised by the 
adolescents, or nadsats, o f this chaotic society*’. This nowhere and no time slang confers a 
certain flexibility to the time and space o f the story. Alex’s saga could take place iq any city 
o f the Western capitalist world, in any time from atout the 1980’s on. But as much as the 
narration does in relation to the audience, the vocabulary also denaturalises de language o f the 
narrator, provoking a estrangement that signals a difference between Alex and the reader. 
Language has, thus, the double and contradictory frmction o f creating conq)licit and, at the 
same time, unposiug a barrier between narrator and his audience.
This blend o f approximation and distance pronaoted by the narrative is even more 
enq)hatic in the cinematic adaptation o f the novel In Stanley Kubrick’s fikn, the narrator o f 
the story is Alex as well. Or to put it better, in the film, Alex is one o f the narrative agents. As 
Chatman suggests, a narrator is not necessarily a human entity. Any narrative text, whatever 
media actualises it, presents a narrator, but in some cases it is not so easily identifiable as in a 
literary first-person narrative (126). Christian Metz refers to this narrator with the foliovsnng 
analogy; ‘The spectator perceives the images which have obviously been selected (they could 
have been other images) and arranged (their order could have been different). In a sense he is 
leafing through an album o f predetermined pictures, and it is not he who is turning the pages 
but some ‘master o f ceremonies’, some ‘grand image-maker’.” (21) There is, then, a narrator 
which is inherent to the cinematic medium; the one that shows, in opposition to the one that 
tells, more typical in the literary narrative. In ACO, the cinematic narrator is complemented by 
(and generally subjected to) the voice-over, which performs the function o f verbal teUmg.
Sarah K ozbff calls attention to a common theoretical niisinterpretation in the 
distinction between showing and telling. According to her, some authors (such as Barthes, in 
The Rhetoric o f  Image) understand the shovwng function as a non-mediated presentation o f
Some editions of the novel prKent a final glossary elaborated by Stanley Edgar Hyman, in 1963 (in; The 
Kubrick Site). The translatic»is I provide in the quotaticais are Inman’s work. Burgess initial intention, however, 
was that the meaning of the nadsat wards could be guessed throughout the stcay, according to the context.
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the referent, as if the im ^e came to the spectator in its supposed pure meaning, which would 
not have suffered the interference o f a narrator’s personality and ideology (13-15). In cinema, 
however, the image is submitted to manipulation through a number o f resources amongst 
lighting, camera position, and set design that contribute to the construction o f meanings. 
Therefore, the cinematic narrator, the one that shows, is not a neutral mechanism. On the 
contrary, it is no less able to promote cultural and ideological values than the literary narrator.
In ACO, there is, then, at least two recognisable narrative agents: the voice-over­
inherited from Burgess’ novel-and the narrator I will name here “camera-narrator”. The term 
is certainly limited, for, as I have mentioned before, the camera is fer from being the only 
responsible for the production o f image. But I will use the expression “camera-narrator” 
throughout, in the absence o f a more appropriate nomenclature, to designate the narrator that 
shows, the one that narrates through images.
The expression “voice-over” also deserves explanation, specially in what refers to its 
distinction from “voice-off”. The latter refers to any voice (it can be a narrator but also a 
common character), whose origin is out o f the sight o f the spectator. There is always the 
possibility that the source o f the voice is revealed some shots later. Voice-over, on the other 
hand, does not exist within the time/space o f the story. It is only in the discourse, in the act o f 
telling the events that it is manifested, or, as Genette prefers, the voice-over is part o f the 
extra-diegetic universe.
In Kubrick’s ACO, the voice-over preserves the characteristics o f the narrator o f 
Burgess’ novel: the colloquial tone, the femiliarity with the spectator and the vocabulary 
(which is sinqjlified in the film, but not enough to cancel its strangeness). The relation o f  
proximity/distancing found in the novel is reproduced in the film with the contribution o f the 
camera-narrator, in such a way that the ambiguity o f Alex’s character is reflected in the
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narrative. The two narrators alternate and combine themselves in a permanent play with the 
spectator’s sympathy and rejection towards the prot^onist,
2,4 Dissecting the orange
The narrative is symmetrically divided in two blocks in which Alex is respectively 
the aggressor and the victim (even though this distinction can be blurred by the conylexity o f 
his character), and interlinked by the period o f his arrest and treatment. The mathematical 
composition o f the narrative structure, which is typical o f Kubrick (see for example 2001 and 
Full Melal Jacket), is o f fimdamental inifiortance for the construction o f a dialect o f 
identification and detachment in ACO. Alex’s ambivalent personality-the prot^onist is a mix 
o f sensibility, cleverness and cruelty-finds echo in the very structure o f the narrative.
The first images o f the film announce something unusual. The lugubrious, gloomy 
music follows the credits (information is economic, reduced to the essential) that are 
superposed to a back cloth o f shinny colours, primary like Alex’s untamed instincts, helping 
to establish the atmosphere o f the movie that begins. The narrative initiates with a close-up o f 
Alex’s fece (Malcolm McDowell) staring at the camera. The camera then starts a travelling 
out that transforms the close in a long shot. The movement gradually reveals the presence o f  
Alex’s three partners, or droogs, and then the space in which the scene takes place. We see 
the black walls o f the Korova Milbar where white inscriptions indicate the speciality o f the 
house-vebcet, synthemesc, drencrom-and then white statues o f naked women placed as 
tables, wearing colourful wigs. Other statues show women on their knees inclined to the fi’ont 
as if  offering their breasts-these, as we will leam afterwards, correspond to our cofifee or 
Coca-Cola machines. Some seconds later, Alex’s voice is heard:
There was me, that is Alex, and my three droogs, that is Pete, Georgie and Dim. 
And we sat in the Korova milkbar trying to decide what to do in the evening. The
46
Korova milkbar sold milk plus; milk plus velocet, or synthemesc, or drencrom, 
which was what we were drinking. This would sharpen you up and make you 
ready for a bit o f the old ultra-violence.
The voice-over follows the same movement done by the camera; Alex, then his droogs, and 
finally the place. Besides, the voice is immediately associated to Alex’s figure. His eyes 
feeing the camera (he is the only who does so) and his position as a centre o f the firame 
reinforce his condition o f leader o f the group and nuclear character in the starting narrative. 
His challenging and strange gaze, with the one felse eyelash, is also a first indication o f the 
perverse personality that will be verbally expressed by the familiarity with which he addresses 
“the old ultra-violence.”
The shock produced by the bizarre set and costumes is diminished by the verbal 
explanation. The voice-over acts, in this scene, in the exposition o f the narrative, that means, 
it introduces the events and didactically provides information so that the image can be 
understood, approximating the viewer to the universe o f the protagonist. A similar behaviour 
o f the verbal narrator is observed throughout the story, particularly in the first part, 
introducing a new location or elements o f Alex’s routine.
The strangeness o f the environment in this very first scene denounces a threatening to 
the moral conventions o f Western civilisation, or else, a threatening to the hypocrisy o f 
Western civilisation. Women are literally objectified by the statues in erotic poses-open legs, 
the sex feeing the camera-they are robbed o f their fimctions o f human bodies to become 
commodities. Apparently, that is a society that does not know any shame, or political 
correctness, that does not mask its prejudices. There is no attempt to mitigate the e?q)loitation 
o f woman as a (sexual) object, on the contrary, sexism is declared. When the male body is in 
question, on the other hand, the acceptance is not the same. In the Cat Lady scene, for 
instance, Alex is first amazed and then disgusted by the woman’s erotic art collection,
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particularly by the sculpture o f a gigantic penis with which, not coincidentally, he finally kills 
her, as a reafBrmation o f his masculine power.
The images o f women displayed throughout the film-with maybe the exception o f  
Alex’s mother and a doctor, who presents a very military posture and is in a dominant 
position in relation to him-are predominantly related to sex, generally violent sex, in which 
women subdue to the protagonist’s virile force. And ironically, the most respected feminine 
figure in the film is exactly the statue. After having attacked the writer’s house, and brutally 
raped his wife in the most shocking scene o f the movie, the gang returns to the Korova, and 
Dim (performed by Warren Clarke) addresses one o f the statues in a soft fiiendly tone: 
“Hello, Lucy, had a busy night? We’ve been working hard too.” While he moves a phallic 
handle-crank placed between her legs in order to fillin  his glass with the nailk that comes out 
o f her breast, he says: “Pardon me, Lucy.” The statue inspires him a humane attitude o f which 
real women are deprived. Something seems to be out o f order here. Values are dislocated. 
Like language in Dr. Strangelove, the meaning o f things is misplaced, and apparently the 
logic o f Alex and the gang’s social conduct are not that o f civilisation As Menezes says, there 
is in the film a deterritorialisation o f the places, which, he suggests, could be the soiirce o f  
the spectator’s uneasiness about ACO  (65).
The second sequence o f the fihn opens with an old drunk beggar singing alone in a 
tunnel. His body is gradually covered by the enormous shadows o f Alex and his gang, who 
walk to him like ghosts, anticipating the moment in which they will cover the man’s body 
with kicks and beats, as if the ape firom 2001 had learned to use the club for somethii^ else 
than acquiring food and shelter. The narrator ejq)lains: “One thing I could never stand was to 
see a fiWiy dirty old drunk, howling away the filthy songs o f his fether’s and going blerp, 
blerp in between as it might be a filthy old orchestra in his stinking rotten guts.” The 
description is certainly disgusting. The first victim o f the gang, who is o f course an innocent
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unable to defend himself, is also an outsider, a character that is reproached, repudiated and 
excluded by society. The disgust Alex e)qpresses in his words is no different from that o f the 
general community. Alex (and the film) ex^gerates the prejudices and the cruelty that are 
already present in society, making them so visible that it is impossible to ignore their 
existence. Hence, Alex does not simply obey a different code o f conduct. Instead, his 
behaviour is an exacerbation o f that o f society. He attests the feilure o f the civilised world to 
control the incoherence and contradictions o f humankind by confining them in institutions, by 
naasking the barbarity o f human relations in the politeness o f society’s discourse and, above 
all, in the oppression o f its silences.
The drunk man’s answer to the first beat is: “Go on, do me, you bastard cowards. I 
don’t want to live in a stinking world like this (...) What sort o f world is it at all? Men on the 
moon and men spinning round the Earth, and there is no attention paid to earthly law no order 
"no more.” In the apparently naive speech o f the old man, the film states the loss o f values 
suggested in Dim’s conversation with the statue, and the crisis o f a civilisation that achieved a 
high degree o f sophistication and yet cannot solve its most tesic problems.
The dislocation o f meanings that appears in the first part o f the film is also a 
powerfiil mechanism for the creation o f irony, like in Dr. Sirangelove, with the important 
difference that the inconqjatibility o f what verbal language says and what we see in the 
images in ACO  do not result in laughter. That is what happens in some sequences in which the 
camera seems to portray Alex’s thoughts, as when he listens to Beethoven in his room. The 
voice describes his thoughts as “oh, bliss, bliss and heaven ( ...)  as I sloshed [listened] it, I 
knew such lovely pictures.” What follows these words is the image o f a statue o f four Christs 
(ironical in itseM) that, thanks to the montage sequence, seem to be dancing in the rhythm o f  
the symphony. The “lovely pictures” provoked by the music are in feet images o f hangings 
and explosions, or o f his own ik^e characterised like a stylised vampire with bloody teeth.
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There seems to be a dissonance between camera-narrator and voice-over: the visual 
correspondent o f a religious-like discourse is a succession o f catastrophes and bloodshed. 
Nevertheless, within Alex’s universe the two narrations are perfectly consonant. The apparent 
disparity between them only exists in the universe o f the spectator.
That composition o f the narrative reinforces the distance between the spectator and 
Alex. But it does not take long until the narrative restarts the approximation by means o f 
camera movements that seem to copy the character’s behaviour. In the following morning, 
while Alex leaves his room half-naked and walks through the corridor, the camera follows 
him from behind. He passes in front o f an open door and does not seem to notice the presence 
o f a man sat on the bed (Mr Deltoid, his advisor, performed by Aubrey Morry). Similarly, the 
camera-narrator does not show the man directly. We only have a glimpse o f him when Alex 
turns on the light o f the corridor. When the protagonist arrives at the living room and realises 
that something strange had happened, the camera stops with him for a moment and then does 
the same route back to the bedroom, this time being followed by Alex until he arrives at the 
door, when the camera shows Mr. Deltoid in a medium shot. The voice-over is absent here, 
but the camera movement manifests the presence o f a first-person narrator, as though the two 
narrative agents were condensed. The camera-narrator reproduces Alex’s sleepiness as well 
as his movements. It seems to be humanised and in some way submissive to the protagonist, 
offering the spectator a view that resembles the one experienced by Alex and &vouring the 
identification between the audience and him.
Moreover, the fact that Alex is narrating the story and therefore presenting the events 
according to his own view o f them is determinant in the film’s treatment o f violence, resulting 
in a distance that dislocates the viewer’s attention from the act o f violence itself. That effect 
provoked the rage o f critics like Pauline Kael, who complains that the film makes us enjoy the 
rapes and beatings by alienating us from the victims, presenting them as individuals incapable
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o f suffering whereas Alex’s suffering is stressed (263). The protagoi^’s pain is no doubt 
more touching than the victims’. The narrative is submitted to him and, according to his 
absolutely selfish philosophy o f life, his own suffering is o f course the only one that matters. 
The victims are generally dehiraianised and ridiculed in the narrative for that is the way Alex 
sees them. Besides, the narrative shows too little about the victims, Alex is the only character 
we follow, while the others come and go quickly and we hardly know anything about them, 
not even about their suffering, since the camera generally does not scrutinise the action. When 
an act o f violence is explicitly shown, like in the case o f the beggar, the camera is placed fer 
enough to omit details. There is always a device to disguise the act o f aggression whenever 
Alex is the agent, be it the darkness which shows only shadows and silhouettes, like the 
spanking o f the drunk man in the tunnel, or the montage sequence which combines the speedy 
alternation o f still pictures with a very imstable hand camera, as in the Cat Lady scene.
One moment that is particularly emblematic o f the distance with which the victims 
are presented is the sequence in which Alex’s gang defies Billyboy’s. The first shot shows a 
jar o f flowers in pastel colours, suggesting a sophisticated decoration. In harmony with the 
image, the sound track displays a classical music that helps to construct an impression o f  
tranquillity and creates in the viewer an expectation that is quicldy firustrated. Feminine cries 
intermittently invade that atmosphere (although the music superinqjoses them) and the camera 
gradually reveals that the flowers are just part o f  what remained from the decoration o f an 
abandoned theatre. In the stage, fiill o f old scenic objects, a group o f young men undress a 
woman and take pains to lay her down in a mattress while she contorts herself in a last effort 
to escape the violation.
The scene could be astonishing. But the camera shares Alex’s point-of-view, and his 
gaze is not directed to the rape. Although inevitably seen, the rape is secondary, as we notice 
from the voice-over: “It was round by the casino that we came across Billyboy and his four
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droogs. They were getting ready to perform a little o f the old in-out in-out with a weepy 
yoimg devotchka [girl] they had there.” By placing violence in a stage, the film turns it in a 
spectacle for both the protagonist and the viewer, and puts the last in the position o f a double 
spectator, who watches the representation o f the representation o f violence. The narrative 
detaches us fix>m the horror o f the action and firom the victim’s agony, suggesting to us the 
same indifference with which Alex feces the event, suggesting that we too look at son^thing 
else than violence.
The scene has a counterpart in the second half o f the narrative. After the Ludovico 
Technique is tested, the authorities responsible for the project organise a sadistic public 
demonstration o f its effective results. Now it is Alex that is taken to a stage to be affronted. 
Instead o f a distant panoramic shot o f the action, the camera shows the boy’s point-of-view, 
sharing with him the vision o f the dirty shoe he is forced to lick, or the woman’s breasts he is 
unable to touch, stressing his subjugation by means o f low angles. If in the previous stage 
scene the spectator was doubly detached fit>m the act o f violence, in this second moment we 
are doubly approximated to it. The camera is in the stage, and Alex, who is the protagonist o f 
the film, becomes also the protagonist o f another spectacle, that o f his humiliation. And even 
though the rape is by concept more brutal than the offences Alex goes through in the stage, 
the narrative makes the last sequence more touching.
The ambiguity o f the film is validated by the dual division o f the text. It is supported 
by that parallelism between the first and the second parts, in which the second is the inverted 
image o f the first. As Mainar (61-70) and Falsetto (21) point out, parallelism and narrative 
reversals are remarkable strategies in the director’s style. In ACO, this kind o f organisation 
provides both a connection and a contrast between the two narrative units, and consequently, 
between Alex’s role as a victim and as an aggressor. The stage scenes are an allegory o f what 
happens to the prots^onist in the whole filna. If he is the agent o f violence in the first part,
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being therefore inmiune to its shock, throughout the second part he performs the role o f the 
victim.
The disturbing idraitification that the fihn sought in the first part is replaced in the 
second by the fiunQiar language o f classical Hollywood cinema. That is the moment when the 
film speaks the language to which the spectator has been used. That is the moment when the 
film gives a hero who we can comfortably pity and accept, with a reasonable conflict that 
fits our problem-solving narrative models.
Bordwell explains that classical spectatorship supposes that the viewer has a 
paradigm, an internalised schemata and is able to recognise particular patterns o f narrative 
structure or scenic norms in the films (28-9). That knowledge altows the cinematic resources, 
like lightii^ or editing, to pass relatively unnoticed, reinforcing in this manner the inçression 
o f reality Hollywood cinema general^ pursues. But the use o f classical language in ACO  
serves a different purpose firom that o f creating an “invisible style”. One remarkable trace o f 
Kubrick’s work is to betray that narrative schemata and fiustrate the viewer’s expectation, 
therefore provoking a reflection upon the very making o f the film by denaturalising the 
language and the style. The use o f classical strategies o f identification and o f a more femiliar 
mise-en-scène in the second part o f ACO  is all the more effective because it happens in 
contrast with the estrangement o f the first narrative block, standing out the ambiguous effect 
o f the fiJm as an unit. After showing how cruel, cold and reproachftd Alex is, the film gives 
its strongest si^ estion s that we identify with him and that we fear for his fete.
From the moment Alex is caught by the police on, the shots in which the protagonist 
works as a filter, that is, shots in which the character’s gaze seems to be mediating the 
presentation o f the images (Chatman 157) will be considerably more fi-equent than before. 
When Alex is interrogated in the police ofBce, his condition o f subjugated prisoner is 
reinforced by a low angle that emphasises the humiliation he suffers. That is the first moment
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in the film in which we see a victim o f violence bleeding. As Menezes points out, Alex is the 
only character whose blood is shed to the camera (62).
The voice-over, although less present in the second part, is more appealing. When 
Alex is a prisoner and a victim, attempts to move the spectator proliferate. After his sentence, 
a panoramic view o f the State prison building is followed by the moaning voice: ‘This is 
where the real weepy and like tragic part o f the story begins, oh my brothers and only friends. 
After a trial, with judges in a jury, and some very hard words spoken against your friend and 
humble narrator he was sent to 14 years on Staja no. 84\F.” (rr^ emphasis) In addition to this 
attempt to appeal to the audience’s compassion, the brutality o f the Ludovico Technique 
therapy contributes to transform Alex’s image fi-om that o f a cruel aggressor into that o f  a 
defenceless prey. The violence he suffers during the treatment is institutionalised, promoted 
by a whole groxip that is more powerfiil with its political machine than Alex could be with his 
hands, and more in^rtantly, it is a violence presented according to the victim’s view point. 
The same device that distanced the spectator firom the violence practised by the protagonist in 
the first part o f the narrative, that is, the use o f Alex as narrator and filter, now works to 
approximate the viewer to the violence that is practised against him.
Moreover, the change in Alex’s position fi*om criminal to victim is acconq>anied by 
an aesthetk: change firom the first to the second part o f the film. In prison and after he is 
released, Alex and the other characters (except for his mother and a violet-hair nurse) do not 
wear the nadsat feshion or the colourfiil and bizarre dresses we see in the first part, but 
ordinary clothes. The set decoration creates a seemly aseptic environment, both in prison and 
in other locations. In the writer’s house, the room where Alex rests seems to be nothing but a 
comfortable femUy-house bedroom. The modem art pieces, kitsch decoratwn and gaudy 
paper-walls foimd in Alex’s apartment or in the Korova Milkbar, for instance, are generally 
replaced by light colours and ordinary fiimiture. The femiliarity o f costumes and scenery
diminishes the estrangement o f the first part and brings Alex closer to the spectator’s 
imiverse.
The parallelism that structures the narrative operates not only in the repetition o f sets 
and characters but also in the arrangement o f the fi-ames and in camera movement. When 
Alex plays the “surprise visit” to the writer’s residence, the camera shows him and his droogs 
sneaking in through the garden during the night. The next shot is inside the house (a view that 
Alex does not have): the writer is sat at a table, working in a typewriter. A lateral travelling 
reveals the internal architecture o f the house and when the camera achieves the opposite side 
o f the room, we see the writer’s wife reading in a strange armchair. The bell rings, we know 
that it is Alex, but the couple does not. The woman answers the door, Alex asks for help, she 
asks her husband what to do, he tells her to open, and finally they attack.
In the second part, after being tortured by his former partners who became members 
o f the police, Alex finds hinaself at HOME again. The place looks familiar, but he does not 
recognise it at first. We see him hesitantly entering the garden. Then an internal shot shows a 
picture that is symmetric to the one in the first part: the writer working in firont o f a 
typewriter (only its colour is different, for Alex has destroyed the first one), the books placed 
on the background. The composition o f the fi:ame is exactly the same. A similar lateral 
travelling shows the rest o f the room. But in the place we expect to see the woman, there is a 
strong and tall bodybuilder exercising. The im ^e o f the bodybuilder, in addition to the fact 
that Alex has been involuntarily meeting his victims and suffering their revenge, suggests 
that at HOME, were he committed his most violent crime, will be also the place o f  the most 
violent revenge. The voice-over does not interfere in the suspense-that is increased by the 
repetition o f the dialogue-and the spectator is free to fear for Alex as she or he may have 
feared for the couple in the first part. The expectation is firustrated when Alex is not 
recognised and finds sheher. But his role as a victim is established.
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When, afterwards, the boy denounces himself and is tortured by the writer and his 
partners, repetition comes into play again in order to reinforce Alex’s change o f roles. The 
protagonist is locked in the bedroom when he starts to hear Beethoven’s synq)hony, then a 
parallel editing shows the writer in his ofiBce, listening to his cries that cross the syn5)hony 
like the girl's cries have done in the Billyboy sequence. The shot is similar to the opening o f  
the film: the writer is shown first in a close-up and a travelling out reveals three people 
surrounding him (his political partners) who are equivalent to Alex’s droogs. The camera 
moves up to the opposite side o f the room, revealing the place, just as it has done in the 
Korova. Instead o f the white statues we see a phonograph. The writer now is the sadistic 
leader and Alex is the prey. Instead o f Alex’s secure and arrogant gaze, the old naan has a 
perturbed, but also perverse expression.
We had the chance to sympathise with the writer’s suffering in the first part o f  the 
fihn, for the rape o f his wife is announced (although nothing is explicitly shown) in a rather 
aggressive and sadistic naanner, with Alex meticulously cutting the woman’s clothes in the 
breasts, then firom the legs up to the neck until he leaves her wearing only the socks, torturing 
both the couple and the viewer with the possibility that he will tear her nipples away with the 
scissors. But then, in the second part o f the narrative, the writer is transformed in a bizarre 
character. And although we know that his behaviour is a consequence o f his trauma and that 
his wife is now dead, his figure is made repulsive, fiiU o f strange mannerisms that make him 
look abnormal and inhumane, whereas Alex is presented as an ordinary boy.
The proximity between Alex and viewer achieves its apex in the narrative when the 
protagonist tries to commit suicide. In pain and despair due to the extreme discomfort he 
feels when listening to the Ninth Syn^hony, Alex jumps through the window. The voice­
over explains: “Suddenly I vidied [saw] what I had to do, and what I had wanted to do, and 
that was to do myself in, to snuff it, to blast o ff forever o f this wicked and cruel world. One
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moment o f pain perhaps, and then sleep for ever and ever and ever.” The camera reproduces 
his M  and turns off when Alex reaches the ground and looses consciousness. The following 
silence and the black screen deprive the spectator from the knowledge o f what happened 
between Alex’s fell and his recovering in the hospital. Both the camera and the voice-over 
seem to serve Alex, as if the narrative had stopped in respect to the character’s absence.
The following shot shows Alex moaning in a hospital bed and the voice-over starts 
ironical: “I jurcqjed, oh my brothers, and I fell hard. But I did not snuff it. If I had snuff it I 
would not be here to tell what I told now. I came back to life after a long black gap o f what 
might have been a million years.” The long black gap also happened to the spectator. To 
solve the problem o f providing the information missing in the ell^sis, Kubrick resorts to a 
more impersonal narrator, one that does not compromise the voice-over. Shots o f newspapers 
reporting the polemics o f the media inform the events o f which Alex may not be aware: 
“Government accused o f inhuman means in crime reform”, “Alex driven to suicide by 
scientists.” The newspaper could be the means through which Alex hiniself came to know 
what happened, and so his control over the narrative is maintained. Besides, the device o f the 
newspapers attributes a dramatic tone to the story, fevouring Alex’s image as victim.
The sharing o f information is also a powerfiil means o f approximating the spectator 
to Alex. For Branigan, “narration involves concealing information as much as revealing it.” 
(82) Thus, when the narrative concedes the viewer the privilege o f sharing Alex’s knowledge, 
therefore allowing the audience to know more than the other charactere in the story, the 
viewer is treated as an accomplice o f Alex’s acts. Take the example o f the end o f the 
sequence already described, when Alex meets Mr. Deltoid in his parents room. The advisor 
reveals his suspicion that Alex has committed certain crimes in the previous night and Alex 
denies his responsibility, but the spectator knows he is guilty. The last shot o f the sequence 
has Alex as a filter. The spectator cannot see him because the image presented by the camera-
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narrator is exactly the one that Alex experiences. Mr. Dekoid is seen sat on the bed, picking 
up a glass o f water that lies in the bedside table and drinking. Besides the water, however, the 
glass contains a set o f dentures. The spectator sees it, Alex sees it, but Dekoid does not. At 
the sanffi time Alex is saying to his advisor: “You can rely on me, Sr.” Although the spectator 
does not have a choice, he/she connives at Alex’s lies, sharing his joke and taking part in his 
irony.
2.5 Conclusion
Nevertheless, Alex is a spectator as well. The treatment to which he is submitted 
consists o f making o f him an spectator, one that is forced to react negatively to the same kind 
o f violence that we have been seeing since the beginning o f the story. Wearing a straitjacket, 
wHh his eyelids held apart by tweezers, Alex is tied to a chair feeing the screen so that he has 
no way to avoid the sight o f the violent films they show him. His initial reaction, before the 
effects o f the drugs can be fek, is o f  delight. And while he watches a teenage gang like his 
spanking a man he reflects: “It is funny how the colours o f the real world only seem really 
real w^en we viddy [see] them on the screen.”
Would Kubrick be suggesting that the film is a mirror image o f our civilisation? 
Reality portrayed in sharper vibrant colours? The uneasiness that the movie provokes could 
be, then, derived fi*om our inabilky to recognise ourselves in that mirror or by the discomfort 
to see exposed a part o f ourselves that we prefer to deny. That leads us back to the idea that 
the film violates the stability o f our experience as viewers. By pushing us to an empathetic 
relation with Alex, the film could be forcing us to acknowledge the violence and cruelty o f 
our own nature, defying the anthropocentrism that still prevails in our culture to show that the 
human being-including, o f course, the spectator-is also a beast. No matter how sophisticated 
humankind has become, with its complicated rules and mstitutions, the ambiguous original
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energy-productive and destructive-that the ape discovered with the bone in 2001 remains a 
part o f human nature.
And yet, that all happens in a film tliat shows little violence directly. Alex’s acts are 
much more suggested (or at least only introduced) than reaUy pictured. When, after stripping 
the woman and before raping her, he says to the writer “viddy well, little brother, viddy 
well”, the spectator is not allowed to share the husband’s astonishing vision. All we see is the 
tormented fece o f the man, who also becomes an spectator. And then, the violence that is 
practised against the writer, that is, making him look at the act o f violence, seems to be even 
crueller than the rape itself-as much as the sight o f Alex felling sick, festened in a straitjacket 
and with his eyes widened is much more moving than the violence he is watching to, which 
passes almost unnoticed to us. In those scenes, what shocks is not necessarily violence, but 
the act o f seeing and therefore acknowledging violence. Ironically, then, the spectacle o f  
violence becomes more important than violence itself and the colours in the screen shine 
brighter than in the real world. The violence that is not stated by the screen does not disturb, 
and becomes part o f the silence that also characterises human relations in Western 
civilisation. The violence that is inched in the ritualised dinner in 2001, hiding the brutality 
that was necessary for the acquisition o f food. The violence that is justified by the logic o f  
war in Dr. Strangelove. The violence that is absorbed by routine until it seems natural to 
explore women’s bodies as objects, to expel the citizens who do not fit the institutions, to 
make the poKce more dangerous than the criminals. If the film is the image o f civilisation, 
then Alex is the crisis o f that civilisation, its violence and cruelty made undeniable and 
uncontrollable.
But again, this is only one among several possibilities o f readings that the film offers. 
And if  it is tempting to resort to one interpretation in order to make the film more suitable to 
our conventions, it is also worth remembering the ambiguity that characterises it. Maybe
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Kolker is right when he says that “there are no honest or even responsible answers to the 
problems [the film] poses.” Maybe the point is exactly that. And then, as much as the 
narrative makes us focus on sonaething else than the astonishing violence it presents, the place 
that the film reserves to the spectator (including the critics) should make us search for 
something else than answers. Because, maybe, there is really none.
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Final Remarks
There are tunes I am ashamed 
to be a member of human race 
Paths o f Glory
Sunnnaiy
In this research I investigated how the ambiguity that marks Kubrick’s filmography 
takes form in his most polemic film, A Clockwork Orange. I began by delineating the 
trajectory o f ambiguity in his other films, in an attempt to understand the different feces it can 
acquire and what view o f the world imderUes Kubrick’s creation. As an auteur, Stanley 
Kubrick developed a work that is characterised by an ascending refixsal to offer solutions. The 
films are provocative, and particularly in the productions since the 1960’s, the films pose 
questions that can be read from a variety o f different perspectives without attaching 
themselves to any particular answer. Taking three movies as a sample o f the director’s work, a 
tried to explain how a pessimistic vision o f human fete and o f civilisation that already existed 
in Kubrick’s initial movies invades the form o f the film and is reflected not only in the plot 
but in the very structure o f the narratives and in the construction o f characters. The films 
usually deal with individuals that are either isolated and impotent before the cruelty and the 
incoherence o f the world to which they belong. And even in films like Paths o f  Glory (1957) 
and Spartacus (1960), which present typical heroes as standards o f the positive values 
defended, there seems to be a sense o f entrapment, with the heroes having to fight against a 
powerfiil and oppressive environment, in a battle where logic, sensibility and reasoning are 
useless in fece o f the greed and selSshness that dominates. Dr. Strangelove denies heroism, 
and humankind-condemned by its incapability o f imderstanding and control its own 
destructive power-stick itself to an enqjty language, in which meanings and things are 
incongruent. The absence o f heroes decentralises the narrative, but there is still a moral and
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political stand behind the satire, and its that defined position that crashes from the next films 
on. In 2001, the origin o f that destructive power coincides with tlie origin o f civilisation and, 
more important than that, that power, which is productive a well, is the very energy that impel 
civilisation to development. Humankind will be able to construct a sophisticated society, to 
change radically its environment, to submit the other species to its power, and yet all that 
xtoowledge will not help humans to understand their own existence. In Eyes Wide Shut, the 
individual is surrounded by the contradictions o f desire, and by the inconçatibility between 
desire and the institutions in which civilisation is organised. In that film, however, there 
seems to be a more resigned acceptance o f ambiguity, with the individuals giving up the 
absolute belief in institutions and the search for answers. The films present a distinctive style 
that seems to detach the audience from the fictional world, rather than approximating it, as it 
traditionally happens in Hollywood cinema.
The analysis o f ACO focus on the construction o f  ambiguity in the film narrative. 
The loss o f a moral centre that is developed along the director’s filmography acquires, in 
ACO, the aspect o f an amoral character and a consequent amoral narrative. The protagonist 
Alex is given the role o f narrator and o f character-filter, so that both in the time/space o f the 
discourse and in that o f the story, the narrative is submitted to Alex. Therefore, the cold and 
inhnmane treatment he reserves to his victims is reflected in the form through wliich the 
information is rendered. The bipolar role Alex plays-as an aggressor is the first part o f  the 
story, and as victim in the second-is crucial to the construction o f ambiguity both in his 
personality and in the film. Since Alex commands the narrative, his own pain is stressed in 
opposition to the distant presentation o f the victim’s suffering. Besides, the narrative 
contributes to approximate Alex and the spectator, suggesting an intimate relation between 
them, treating the viewer as a supporter o f his acts.
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Conclusion
“Whose side are you, son?”, asks the official to the young private in Full Metal 
Jacket, but the question could well be addressed to Stanley Kubrick himself. That is, in fact, 
with different words, the way critics react to most o f the director’s films and, no doubt, 
mainly to A Clockwork Orange. Not resigned with the absence o f answers in the film, Kolker 
argues that ambiguity can “remove the tasks from the film’s initial creator”, resulting in an 
“yieWing up o f responsibility.” (117) Rather then irresponsible however, ambiguity is a brave 
choice. It would be more comfortable not to con:q)romise oneself with the complexity o f the 
questions that the film poses and adopt a secure standpoint, one that conformed with the 
general view that solves the problem by punishing the evil element in the story and then 
treatii^ it as a negative other defined in contrast to the positive morality o f the film.
The film avoids judging Alex. ACO  ignores the Manichaean imaginary botindary 
between good and evil, between right and wrong, and places itself in a dangerous liiribo. The 
events are then presented firom the perspective o f someone who, despite being perfectly 
capable o f differing between what is right and wrong according to the society to which he 
belongs, has chosen singly not to take that difference into consideration and to obey only his 
own desires, which happen to be wrong. One can conclude that, by refiising to condemn Alex, 
the film takes the risk o f soimding supportive, o f being “in the side o f evil.”
For critic J. Burgess, Kubrick’s point would be clear: “Alex, who has chosen evil, is 
better than all the mealy-mouthed others in the film who have either chosen evil pretending its 
good or have timidly not chosen at all.” (33) Indeed, other characters in the story are made as 
unattractive as someone like Alex could see them. The ones who are on the side o f  the 
institutions, like government or the femily, are either ridiculously apathetic, like Alex’s 
parents, or cynical, like the doctors and the Home Secretary. The society that the film depicts 
is thoroughly dehumanised and Alex seems to be the only vivacious figure. In that
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environment, Alex’s eagerness to provoke and see suffering seems a kind o f nostalgia for 
intensity, for sensibility. As Feldman notes, Alex is “the only character in the movie who is 
nol a clockwork orange.” (16)
But should Kubrick really take sides? The narrative seems to suggest that we look 
beyond violence, and then beyond our moral positions. “Viddy well, little brother, viddy 
well”, tells Alex, but what we see is not the act o f  violence itself. As much as the spectator 
must re-accommodate the meanings o f words and images in order to understand the coherence 
between the heavenly blissful feeling the boy has while listening to Beethoven and the scenes 
o f murders and disasters he imagines, the whole fihn demands that we abandon moral and 
also aesthetic conventions, that we dislocate our focus o f attention. Maybe it does not matter 
much if  Alex is right or wrong-there is no doubt that he jeopardises order, law and the 
innocent citizen-maybe the question is not who is better than who, but how humankind could 
have built a civilisation where the only form o f liveliness and the only effective vehicle for 
self-e:q)ression seems to be violence. How we could have built a civilisation which destroys 
itself. That initial energy that is embedded in the ape’s discovery in 2001 and which marks the 
beginning o f civilisation is present in ACO  both in Alex and in the society to which he 
belongs. And as the narrative makes Alex an attractive character, it suggests that that energy 
belongs to the viewer as well. The film does not dissociate the spaces, viewer and characters 
belong to the same universe, that o f a decadent civilisation.
Feldman understands ACO, and Kubrick’s filmography in general, as a statement that 
civilisation was buih upon a mistaken model o f human nature. Institutions, forged to control 
men and women, ignore aspects o f human behaviour that are not interesting to the order they 
attempt to install. For the critic, Alex is “the chief evidence that the significant order o f  
civilization is collapsing”, for he is the untamed id (15), a discontent o f civilisation. Feldman
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borrows from Freud** the idea that the progress o f civilisation depends on the repression or 
sublimation o f the instinctual id, denying inherent aspects o f human nature and resulting in 
the frustration o f primal desires and instincts. Therefore “a civilization in decline would be 
marked by the increasing ineffectuality o f those forms to control the e)q)ression o f tte  id and 
eventually by the unhampered re-emergence o f the id itself.”(16) It is not violence itself that is 
in question then, but the environment that, in trying to ignore its existence, gives it the very 
reason to show up so intensely. Alex, thus, is the nightmare o f civilisation. His attitudes attest 
the feilure o f civilisation to nullify human contradictions. As Feldman points out, Alex is not 
only a symbol o f the decadent civilisation, but also the very energy that will provoke its 
collapse.
Alex is an outsider, a “dissident”, as Menezes says (77). Because he represents a 
threaten to the established order, he is excluded, confined and then artificially shaped to fit the 
model society needs him to conform But he could have been absorbed as well, as it happens 
to his old droog Dim, whose destructive potential is enqjloyed by the police, and therefore, in 
fevour o f the order. The problem, then, is not whether he is violent or not, but in advantage o f 
whom that violence is being used. There are particular contexts, in which Alex’s violence is 
more than acceptable, it is even welcomed by society. War, for instance, is one o f  them War 
could be understood as a moment o f crisis o f civilisation, when the institutions, having foiled 
to keep order according to their own rules, must resort exactly to those elements o f human 
nature they tried to suppress. War is a moment in which civilisation requires the repressed 
violence in its service and creates a chaos disguised in the discipline o f the army and 
supported by the excuse o f patriotism. Joker (Mathew Modine), the protagonist o f Kubrick’s 
Full Melcd Jacket^ is very similar to Alex, maybe with a difference in intensity: he is young, 
intelligent, sardonically hunoorous, conscious o f (but not shocked by) his own acts and the
Civilisation and Its Discontents, 1929.
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brutality o f the world in which he lives, with an affected excitement about violence. One 
difference, however, is crucial: Joker is an authorised killer.
A sokiier in Vietnam, Joker does not only have the opportunity to exercise his violent 
potential, he is also intensely trained and stimulated to do so, as it is expressed by the 
discourse o f the recruits’ drill instructor: “It’s your killer instinct that must be harnessed if  
you expect to survive in combat. The rifle is only a tool, it is the hard heart that kills. If your 
killer instincts are not plain and strong you’ll hesitate in the moment o f truth. You will not 
kill.” And it is Joker himself who explains: “The instructors are proud to see that we are going 
beyond their control. The Marine Corp does not want robots, the Marine Corp wants killers, 
the Marine Corp wants to build indestructible men, men without fear.” The Marine Corp 
wants Alex. What escapes Joker, as Michael Pursell points out (223), is that when they go 
“beyond the control” is when the control show^ to be the most effective, that is, when the 
boys finally become cold killers as the State needs them to be.
But there seems to be nothing wrong if  we sympathise with Joker. Sympathising with 
the smart kid that fights in Vietnam to defend the interests o f his country is in accordance 
with the moral values o f Western civilisation. If this smart kid shows a sadistic curiosity 
towards killing it is even better. In that particular situation, murder becomes acceptable. War 
is one o f the barbarisms necessary to sustain civilisation, it is violence ritualised by ethic 
codes that try to determine how brutal can a nation be against another. But in the local sphere, 
in the battle fields, it does not count on institutions, it depends on individual men’s power to 
destroy the other, and then, civilised manners are not o f much use.
Considering that ACO  is settled in an undetermined fiiture in a Western nation, we 
would not go too fer suggesting that Joker is the Alex-to-be. The brutal training in Parris 
Island in Full Metal Jacket is the reverse conditioning o f the Ludovico Technique in ACO, 
when the government tries to tame the beast it helped to produce. But it would be too
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simpKstic to defend Alex as a victim o f  the system or to say, about Joker, that the army turns 
innocent boys into mxirderers. The point is that for Kubrick nobody is innocent. As Smith 
discusses in his article The Beast Within, what we see in Full Metal Jacket is that the war does 
not generate destructive instincts, it just gives them space to flourish. For Smith, in this film 
as in the rest o f Kubrick’s work man is depicted “as a barely restrained savage whose social 
institutions reflect his innate depravity.” (230)
So man is just the opposite o f the Rousseaunian ideal o f natural goodness. Alex, the 
pre-civilised man is just as evil as the highly civilised government who tries to domesticate 
him, and for that problem the film, again, does not offer a solutk>n. All the film offers is 
perplexity, the pessimism that underlies Kubrick’s films in general and that presents people 
condenmed, like the Greek Dedalus, to live in the maze they have constructed and cannot 
imderstand. But if  perplexity does not evolve to transformation, it generates paralysis. 
Pessimism could be useful as a process o f maturation, but it is necessary to go beyond 
pessimism, to leam firom it if  one does not vrant to stagnate. Trying to find a way out o f the 
labyrinth, Dedalus, the unfortunate inventor whose creations were both impressive and the 
cause o f misery, flied out in his wax wings. Kubrick, however, denies us the wings, as he has 
done to the writer in The Shining, who dies firozen in his allucinated search. The viewer must 
mould her own wings. Escaping or learning to survive in the maze and then overcome the 
state o f perplexity and the pessimistic stage is a task that the fihn leaves to the spectator.
Shocked with the conclusion that man is a savage and that institutions are inefficient, 
Hechinger wrote: “(...) what sort o f social insthutions are to be built on that pessimistic, 
antiliberal view o f man’s nature? They wiU-they must, if logic prevails-be repressive, 
illiberal, distmstfiil violent institutions o f fescism.” ®^ The problem is that the fihn suggests 
that logic does not prevail, at least not that same logic that constmcted the civilisation in
19 Ibid.
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question. And as much as the lost astronaut in 2001, the spectator is left with the challenge to 
figure out the meanings o f things according to a new logic, the challenge to construct other 
paradigms.
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